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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Problem of Food Deserts 
The term 'food desert' is meant to conjure an imagery of barren plains without a supply of 
food. Thinking of a non-industrialized aesthetic, one can plainly view an area without a source of 
food as a vast area of dirt and rock in which little to no plant life exists. In an industrialized 
urban landscape we no longer see barren stretches of land denoting a loss of food - areas with 
plentiful foods are housed in buildings surrounded by concrete. It is the lack of housing for the 
distribution of foods - typically supermarkets - that now represents this barren plain. Residents of 
these food deserts must travel to more plentifully stocked areas of the city in order to find food.  
This is not to say there is an objective lack of food in food deserts - the term denotes a 
valuation of types of 'food' as 'food'. One can say the term food desert is moralizing - claiming 
certain foods are not acceptable for consumption and defining acceptable diets. The conception 
of a 'food desert' is most strongly associated with access to fruits and vegetable (likely tied into 
the lack of intake of fruits and vegetables in American culture). According to Ford et al. (2008) 
the term food desert was introduced in the U.K. in the early 1990’s to describe geographical 
areas with limited access to retail grocery stores. A common definition of food deserts is posited 
by Furey et al. (2001) as an area where people do not have easy access to healthy, fresh foods, 
particularly if they are poor and have limited mobility. ‘Food’ is then defined as what is deemed 
healthy by the researcher and exists largely at retail supermarkets.  
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Regardless, this moralizing sits on top of a reality of the consequences of diet on health 
and the role of the geographic proximity to certain types of food on diets. While diet is indeed 
cultural, there are health related repercussions of diet (though these consequences of diet also 
depend on the way one lives). If we take health as the morally prominent motivator for food 
choice, lacking geographic proximity to a supermarket (and thus access to fruits and vegetables 
and other perishables) is a serious problem in American society. In fact, research has shown that 
residents of areas without supermarkets tend to have worse health outcomes including higher 
rates of obesity, cardiovascular disease and diabetes and lower rates of fruit and vegetable intake 
(Franco et al. 2009; Michimi and Wimberly 2010; Moore et al. 2008; Morland, Wing and Diez 
Roux 2002; Morland and Evenson 2009; Powell et al. 2007) and must pay more for (especially 
healthy) food (Chung and Myers 1997; Kaufman et al. 1997).  
The importance of the presence of supermarkets even extends beyond the health 
outcomes of residents. Being one of the largest employers in the U.S., supermarket placement 
patterns can help to advance or disable the job prospects of nearby residents. Given that retail has 
replaced manufacturing as the largest employer of non-skilled workers in the U.S. (Strait 2001) 
supermarket placement patterns may contribute to the ‘spatial mis-match’ problem noted in 
urban sociology (the mismatch between the location of low skilled workers and low-skilled 
jobs). Supermarkets also provide public spaces for the maintenance of informal social ties 
(Oldenburg 1989; Blanchard et al. 2003). Further magnifying the lack of space to promote social 
cohesion, supermarkets are a symbol of livability (Eisenhauer 2001) and, similar to other signs of 
physical disorder, lacking supermarkets may help to stigmatize the area for both residents and 
non-residents. 
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A large and growing public health literature on food deserts and the ‘food environment’ 
(not to mention the number of grants given to this topic) displays the prominence of the problem 
of access to healthy foods (including access to supermarkets) in the scientific community (c.f. 
Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, Story, & Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009; 
Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2007). Increased concerns over 
obesity have largely contributed to the importance of the problem of food deserts. According to 
the American Medical Association, one of the single greatest actions the United States can take 
to affect health outcomes is to reduce childhood obesity. In fact, in 2010 the office of the 
Surgeon General called the levels of obesity among Americas the most important public health 
issue of our time. This is why Michelle Obama, the Clinton Global Initiative and hundreds of 
other organizations have taken obesity as their primary concern. While many take obesity as an 
individual level problem – in particular by attempting to change the dietary behaviors of 
individuals and families – others look for contextual solutions to curb obesity. Examining the 
‘food environment’ and ‘food deserts’ is one way public health researcher can examine ways to 
curb obesity at a contextual level.  
Along with obesity, others have taken the problem of food deserts as a matter of social 
justice. Some view the lack of health foods in neighborhoods as a form of structural violence – 
where the lack of health foods in a neighborhood does violence to the bodies of neighborhood 
residents. Similarly, ‘food justice’ implies that access to healthy food is not even a question of 
economics (i.e. can a supermarket turn a profit) but a fundamental right to nutrition (c.f. Alkon 
and Norgaard 2009). Concerns over inequalities in the ‘food environment’ have fostered non-
profit (e.g. Social Compact, Market Makeovers, Nashville Mobile Market to name a few of the 
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hundreds nationally) and city governments (e.g. Birmingham, Detroit, L.A.) efforts to bring 
supermarkets (or other sources of healthy foods) to underserved areas. 
Currently, the correlates of supermarket locations are generally agreed upon (c.f. 
Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, Story, & Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009). 
Supermarkets are less common (and food deserts are more likely to exist) in urban areas with 
higher rates of poverty, higher proportions of African Americans, and lower average incomes 
(Algert, Agrawal, & Lewis, 2009; Lee & Lim, 2009; Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 
2002; Powell et al., 2007; Zenk et al., 2005). Much of this research on supermarket location 
implies that the correlates of supermarket placement are their causes: food deserts exist due to 
the demographics of the area. Unfortunately, these public health studies of neighborhood based 
problems ignore the long theoretical and empirical history of ‘the neighborhood’ and spatial 
disadvantage (and spatial resource disparities) in urban sociology. Despite the expansive 
literature on ‘food deserts’ and massive history of urban sociological research and theory, these 
two literatures have evaded each other. Instead of elaborating ‘food deserts’ as a more general 
(urban) problem of neighborhood resource disparities, the (largely public health) ‘food desert’ 
literature has tended to take the correlates of supermarket location as their cause. A major 
contribute of this dissertation is to incorporate urban sociological theory into the study of food 
deserts in order to better understand the causes of the presence of supermarkets in neighborhoods 
(or lack thereof). 
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Urban Sociology and Neighborhood Resources 
Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (as well as Louis Wirth, John Gibbs St. Claire Drake and 
Horace Cayton among others) provided the foundation for urban sociology in the early 20
th
 
century, propagating the ‘urban ecological’ theory of cities and neighborhoods (c.f. Sampson et 
al. 2002). In essence, urban ecologists take the way urban landscapes are spatially 
differentiated/integrated by various demographics – and how these differentiated/integrated 
‘little worlds’ maintain or disrupt social order – as paramount to understanding cities and social 
life more generally. The ‘functional integration’ of neighborhoods is reflected in the material and 
symbolic resources of neighborhoods. Properly functioning neighborhoods produce resources for 
neighborhood residents such as local amenities, organizations and businesses including 
supermarkets. In this sense, the material and symbolic resources of neighborhoods (e.g. 
supermarkets) derive from the proximate ‘functioning’ of neighborhoods. Following the urban 
ecological theory, the ‘neighborhood effects’ model of explanation (c.f. Sampson, 2012) has 
become one of the more influential models in the social sciences (especially since the 1990s): 
neighborhood demographics (e.g. concentrated poverty) lead to negative or positive 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g. a lack of supermarkets) which affects neighborhood resident 
(e.g. obesity). This ‘neighborhood effect’ understanding of neighborhoods resources (and their 
effect on residents) largely corresponds with the (public health) food desert literature. 
Research on neighborhood resource disinvestment during the ‘urban crisis’ has largely 
corresponded with the urban ecology (and ‘neighborhood effects’) explanation of neighborhood 
resources. During the ‘urban crisis’ of the 1970s and 1980s “(a) urban poverty changed over the 
1970s and 1980s and (b) it became more concentrated” (Small and Newman, 2001). Perhaps the 
most popular explanation for changes in urban areas from 1970 to 1990 is William Julius 
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Wilson’s ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ thesis (Wilson, 1987; Small and McDermott, 2006 coined 
the ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ name). Wilson (1987) cites Drake and Cayton (1945) to argue 
that, prior to 1970, predominantly African American neighborhoods had sufficient resources, 
including a great many organizations, due to the fact these neighborhoods were class integrated. 
Then, a combination of black middle income geographic dislocation from lower income blacks 
(due to increased social and political opportunities for middle income blacks) and the exodus of 
the manufacturing jobs from inner-cities during the 1970s and 1980s led to a dramatic increase in 
concentrated inner-city poverty (see also Johnson and Oliver 1991, 1992; Kasarda 1989). The 
flight of manufacturing jobs and middle income African Americans away from low income 
African American neighborhoods created ‘socially disorganized’ neighborhoods characterized by 
concentrated poverty; the functional break down of these neighborhoods with concentrated 
(especially African American) poverty led to an exodus of the symbolic and material resources 
needed by neighborhood residents (e.g. an exodus of supermarkets). 
Massey and Denton (1993) argue that Wilson’s argument places too little emphasis on 
the unique plight of African Americans. According to Massey and Denton (1993), African 
Americans are unique in that they cannot assimilate into white neighborhoods due to a historical 
“series of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors and public policies by which 
whites sought to contain a growing urban black population" (10). This inability to assimilate into 
other neighborhoods is unique for African Americans and leads to an extreme level of social 
isolation and resource deprivation. Given the inability to spatially integrate – and the 
discrimination that leads to a comparative lack of material and symbolic resources provided to 
African Americans – African Americans neighborhoods (regardless of income) fair worse than 
other neighborhoods. In this sense, the continued isolation of African American neighborhoods is 
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an important component of continued neighborhood disadvantage since 1970 (including a lack of 
supermarkets). 
These theories differently argue how the demographics of urban neighborhoods changed 
during the ‘urban crisis’ of the 1970s and 1980s. Wilson’s (1987) “deinstitutionalized ghetto” 
thesis places its focus on the concentration of poverty in (especially African American) urban 
neighborhoods. Massey and Denton (1993) focus on the continued significance of African 
American segregation from whites affecting neighborhood resource disparities. Yet both of these 
theories, by focusing on how demographics changed (or did not change), view the demographics 
of neighborhoods as the causes of neighborhood resource disparities
1
. Whether the demographics 
are African Americans or poverty, both theories agree that the demographic make-up of a 
neighborhood leads to particular outcomes for this neighborhood: The lack of material and 
symbolic resources (e.g. supermarkets) poor and racial minority neighborhoods experience are 
argued to result from the proximate lack of ‘social order’ of 'self-contained little worlds’. 
 
Institutional and City Moderation of Neighborhood Resources 
Recent research has shown organizational and city dynamics moderate the relationship 
between neighborhood demographics and the characteristics (especially the resources) of 
neighborhoods (e.g. Marwell, 2007; Small and McDermott, 2006). This research points out that 
substantial variations in resources exist across contexts and across time for neighborhoods of 
similar demographics. The fact that, for example, low income areas lack organizations is not 
                                                          
1
 This understanding of neighborhoods is also suggested by ‘neighborhood effect’ studies (c.f. 
Sampson et al. 2002) and policies suggesting mixed-income development projects to solve the 
problems of low income areas similarly assume  (c.f. Hyra, 2013). 
8 
 
necessarily due to the proximate ‘functioning’ of the neighborhood or the effect of the 
neighborhood having mostly low income individuals; rather, the lack of organizations is an effect 
of city and organizational dynamics influencing the conditions of these neighborhoods.  
This dissertation develops and empirically demonstrates two new theories of how cities 
and industries moderate the relationship between the demographics and the presence of 
supermarkets in zip codes. First, this dissertation shows how ‘new institutionalism’ (c.f. 
Greenwood, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) can be used to investigate the causes of, 
and possible solutions to, the scarcity of organizations (and the resources they provide) in low 
income areas. It is argued that historically contingent institutional logics are the context in which 
neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. Specifically, this 
dissertation will show that the current institutional logic of the grocery industry, beginning 
around the mid-1970s, devalues low income consumers and leads to fewer supermarkets in low 
income areas compared to the institutional logic of the 1930s through early 1970s. 
These results suggest that changes in the demographics of cities during the ‘urban crisis’ 
of the 1970s and 1980s is an insufficient explanation for changes in the placement of 
supermarkets. The ‘neighborhood effect’ of a lack of supermarkets on residents health, at least 
for low income areas, may be better understood as an effect of the historically contingent 
institutional logic of the grocery industry. In the same vein, instead of changing neighborhood 
demographics (c.f. Hyra, 2013), it is suggested that policy makers may be better served by 
modifying (or creating policy regarding) the institutional logic of the grocery industry to bring 
supermarkets into underserved economically disadvantaged areas. 
Second, this dissertation will show that minority competition theory helps explain the 
negative relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of 
supermarkets in a zip code. I do not have enough of a sample of cities to investigate city level 
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variations in the relationship between supermarkets and demographics during the ‘urban crisis’. 
Instead, I use a national sample of cities in 2010 to demonstrate how cities moderate the 
relationship between the presence of supermarkets and the percentage of African Americans in a 
zip code. Using 2010 U.S. national data, the results will indicate that at low levels of African 
Americans in a city there is low ‘perceived threat’ and low inequality in the placement of 
supermarkets; further, as the percentage of African Americans in the city increases, supermarkets 
are increasingly located away from African Americans; however, at high levels of African 
Americans in a city, the increasing unequal distribution of supermarkets away from African 
Americans declines – theoretically due to the cumulative effect of discrimination and the 
increased ability to attenuate discrimination when numbers are high.  
 
Summary of Dissertation 
In essence, this dissertation shows that the urban ecology and ‘neighborhood effects’ 
explanation of neighborhood resource disparities (c.f. Sampson, 2012) can be better understood 
as ‘city and/or industry’ effects. Empirically, I elaborate this theory by examining the extra-local 
causes of disparities in the presence of supermarkets across zip codes. Much of the (public 
health) research on supermarket location implies that the correlates of supermarket placement are 
their causes: food deserts exist due to the demographics of the area. It is surprising this previous 
research seems content to simply conclude ‘these types of neighborhoods will just be 
underserved by supermarkets unless their demographics are changed’. Many times – instead of 
investigating causes of relationships – public health researchers simply take neighborhood 
relationships as a given (or natural) and suggest possible interventions to curb these 
relationships. Yet, in this case, without an understanding of the broader causes of supermarket 
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location we are left without lasting avenues to combat the problem of being underserved that 
some neighborhoods experience (i.e. only ‘band-aid’ approaches).Would we attempt to eliminate 
diabetes by looking at the demographics of those with diabetes and suggest treatment? Or would 
we examine and intervene in the underlying reason why certain types of people tend to more 
often get diabetes? Why is it that we tend to take the former approach for public health research 
and interventions into neighborhoods? Few studies examine potential variations in the correlates 
of supermarket location patterns (e.g. variation across historical or city contexts); However, 
understanding why variations in the correlates of supermarket location occur (e.g. variation 
across historical or city contexts) should elaborate the causes of, and possible solutions to, 
underserved neighborhoods. 
To show how institutional (institutional logics) and city (minority competition) dynamics 
moderate the relationships between the number of supermarkets in a zip code and the percent in 
poverty and percent African American of the zip code, this dissertation is organized as follows. 
In chapter 2 I show how urban ecological theory and the ‘neighborhood effects’ model of 
explanation have been used to understand the material and symbolic resources of a neighborhood 
(including the presence of supermarkets). I then present two new theories of how (1) institutional 
environments and (2) cities moderate the relationship between neighborhood demographics and 
the location of supermarkets. In chapter 3 I look for historical changes in the relationships 
between the number of supermarkets and the percentage of African Americans and economic 
disadvantage of zip codes from 1970 to 1990. I find that while the percentage of African 
Americans was consistently negative, the relationship between economic indicators and the 
presence of supermarkets changed from 1970 to 1990. In chapter 4 I show how a shift in the 
institutional logic of the grocery industry - from an 'economy of scale' to a 'mix margin 
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merchandising' logic - explains the change in the relationship between zip code economic 
indicators and supermarkets from 1970 to 1990. Finally, though the relationship between the 
percentage of African Americans and supermarkets did not change over time, in chapter 5 I 
show that this relationship varies across cities. I use minority competition theory to show how 
the percentage of African Americans in a city moderates (in a U-shaped pattern) the relationship 
between the percentage of African Americans and the number of supermarkets of the zip codes 
of cities. I conclude (chapter 6) by summarizing the results, their theoretical and policy 
implications and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
CITY AND INDUSTRY CAUSES OF FOOD DESERTS 
 
Neighborhood Effects 
Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (as well as Louis Wirth, St. Claire Drake and Horace 
Cayton among others) provided the foundation for urban sociology in the early 20
th
 century, 
propagating the ‘urban ecological’ theory of cities and neighborhoods (c.f. Sampson et al. 2002). 
In the early 20th century urban scholars – later known as 'urban ecologists' or scholars of the 
'Chicago School’ – attempted to "understand the emergent social processes found in the newly 
large, dense, and heterogeneous modern city" (McQuarrie & Marwell, 2009: 250). Common to 
sociological theory at the time, these scholars focused on how the city created, maintained or 
disrupted the social organization of human interaction (i.e. social order). This empirical and 
theoretical work on 'the city' (especially Chicago) established the neighborhood as a fundamental 
unit of analysis.  According to Park (1925: 10, 40) "where individuals of the same race or of the 
same vocation live together in segregated groups, neighborhood sentiment tends to fuse together 
with racial antagonism and class interests...The processes of segregation establish moral 
distances which make the city a mosaic of little worlds". In essence, urban ecologists take the 
way urban landscapes are spatially differentiated/integrated by various demographics – and how 
these differentiated/integrated ‘little worlds’ maintain or disrupt social order – as paramount to 
understanding cities and social life more generally. 
The functional integration of neighborhoods (spatially concentrated areas of those with 
similar social positions) is reflected in the material and symbolic resources of neighborhoods. 
Properly functioning neighborhoods produce resources for neighborhood residents such as local 
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amenities; for example, the presence of organizations – such as supermarkets – derives from, and 
helps to promote, the social organization of a neighborhood. For urban ecologists, organizations 
play important roles in how neighborhoods properly function, "but mostly by furthering or 
articulating a distinctive neighborhood social order" (McQuarrie & Marwell, 2009: 250). In this 
sense, the material and symbolic resources of neighborhoods (e.g. supermarkets) derive from the 
proximate ‘functioning’ of neighborhoods. Similarly, the absence of resources in a neighborhood 
is viewed as a symptom of a lack of neighborhood social order. 
The ‘neighborhood effect’ line of research stems from urban ecological understanding of 
neighborhoods. Here, neighborhood attributes (especially neighborhood demographics) are 
viewed as providing (or failing to provide) material and symbolic resources to residents (which 
then have effects on neighborhood residents). This line of inquiry challenges methodological 
individualism, arguing that neighborhoods influence the outcomes of residents in ways that 
cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the residents themselves (Sampson, 2012). During the 
1960s to 1980s the ‘neighborhood effects’ line of inquiry tended to focus on the structural 
dimensions of neighborhoods and their associated effects on the residents of these neighborhoods 
(Sampson et al., 2002). Most famously presented in the work of William Julius Wilson (e.g. 
1987), a ‘risk-factor’ approach was used to present how neighborhoods effected residents 
(Sampson, 2012: 47). This risk-factor approach generally argued that ‘if you live in a 
neighborhood with X demographics, you were Y times more/less likely to have Z outcome’. 
According to Sampson et al. (2002), there was a ‘process turn’ in the neighborhood 
effects literature in the 1990s. Criticisms of the neighborhood effects literature in the early 1990s 
(see especially Jencks and Mayer 1990) pointed out that “if growing up in a poor neighborhood 
mattered, intervening processes such as collective socialization, peer-group influence, and 
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institutional capacity were presumably part of the reason (Sampson et al. 2002: 443). Criticisms 
such as these launched a variety of studies attempting to describe the ‘black box’ of 
neighborhood effects: the processes and mechanisms that explain how and why the make-up of 
neighborhoods influenced the outcomes of residents in ways that cannot be reduced to the 
characteristics of the residents themselves. For example, in his 2012 book Sampson generally 
shows that “(a) (neighborhood demographics), notably but not only concentrated “structural 
disadvantage,” (b) affects contextual cultural (and material) conditions, notably but not only 
collective efficacy (and the presence of neighborhood amenities such as supermarkets), which 
then (c) affects individual responses, such as people’s experiences with and perceptions of crime 
and disorder” (Fischer, 2013). This is my use of the term ‘neighborhood effect’ in this 
dissertation: neighborhood demographics (e.g. concentrated poverty) lead to negative or positive 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g. a lack of supermarkets) which affect neighborhood residents 
(e.g. obesity); a graphical representation of this understanding of ‘neighborhood effects’ is 
presented in Figure 1.  
The presence of organizations is one component of the mediating process (‘black box’) of 
how neighborhood demographics affect individual outcomes (Small & McDermott, 2006). 
According to Small and McDermott (2006: 1698) “one strand of the tradition of urban ecology 
was the social disorganization perspective (Shaw and McKay 1969), which, as part of a theory of 
cross-sectional neighborhood differences in crime, posited a relationship between neighborhood 
conditions and the presence of organizations and businesses. Poor, ethnically heterogeneous, 
residentially unstable neighborhoods were unable to sustain businesses and organizations 
because they lacked economic stability and social organization”. In terms of neighborhood 
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effects, demographics effect the pull of organizations to a neighborhood which effect the 
resources needed by residents, and thus, can affect individual outcomes.  
Until recently it has been largely assumed 'the market' explains the relationship between 
neighborhood demographics and the presence of organizations. Many scholars who make claims 
about the presence organizations generally assume the resources that can be extracted from 
neighborhoods (the ‘demand’ of aggregates of individuals) determine the resources supplied by 
organizations to these neighborhoods (the ‘supply to aggregates of individuals) (e.g. Wacquant, 
2008 and especially Wilson, 1996). When investigated empirically, market-based studies take the 
demographic characteristics of neighborhoods as aggregates of consumers who have varying 
demands for goods and services (e.g. the food desert research described below). While mostly 
implicit in more recent ‘neighborhood effects’ studies, the idea that 'the market' affects the 
relationship between neighborhood demographics and the location of organizations has been 
explicitly stated by social disorganization theorist (e.g. Shaw and McKay 1969), retail 
economists (c.f. Brown 1993; Clarkson et al., 1996) and urban sociologists Wilson (1996) and 
Wacquant (2001; 2008).
2
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Wacquant (2001; 2008) claims poor, predominantly African American (hyper) ghetto should be 
understood as a particular institution created after the 1970s that controls/subjugates poor 
African American populations. In this understanding poor, predominantly African American 
neighborhoods have similar characteristics and outcomes on neighborhoods residents across 
different contexts (in the United States). Conversely, I claim that these 'hyper-ghettos' have 
different characteristics and outcomes for residents across contexts (cities and institutional 
environments). 
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The Neighborhood Effect of Food Deserts 
The presence of supermarkets in a neighborhood represents one of the mechanisms 
through which neighborhood demographics affect neighborhood residents. Supermarkets provide 
a variety of resources to communities. Supermarkets provide jobs to communities as one of the 
largest employers in the U.S. (Strait 2001). Supermarkets also can promote social cohesion by 
providing public spaces for the maintenance of informal social ties (Oldenburg 1989; Blanchard 
et al. 2003) and providing a symbol of livability (Eisenhauer 2001). Further, known colloquially 
as the ‘food desert’  literature, a great deal of research has shown that residents of areas without 
supermarkets (i.e. ‘food deserts’3) tend to have worse health outcomes including higher rates of 
obesity, cardiovascular disease and diabetes and lower rates of fruit and vegetable intake (Franco 
et al. 2009; Michimi and Wimberly 2010; Moore et al. 2008; Morland, Wing and Diez Roux 
2002; Morland and Evenson 2009; Powell et al. 2007; though see Boone-Heinonen and Shikany 
2011). Exacerbating problems of access, those in areas with limited access to supermarkets pay 
more for food (Chung and Myers 1997; Kaufman et al. 1997). Concerns over inequalities in the 
‘food environment’ have fostered non-profit (e.g. Social Compact, Market Makeovers, Nashville 
Mobile Market) and city government (e.g. Birmingham, Detroit, L.A.) efforts and have raised 
questions surrounding the issue of 'food justice' (Alkon and Norgaard 2009). 
                                                          
3
 Food deserts are “areas where people do not have easy access to healthy, fresh foods” (e.g. 
Furey et al. 2001), but these food deserts tend to be operationalized as areas (especially zip 
codes) that lack supermarkets. The term 'food desert' is meant to conjure an imagery of barren 
plains without a supply of food. Thinking of a non-industrialized aesthetic, one can plainly view 
an area without a source of food as a vast area of dirt and rock in which little to no plant life 
exists. In an industrialized urban landscape we no longer see barren stretches of land denoting a 
loss of food - areas with plentiful foods are housed in buildings surrounded by concrete. It is the 
lack of housing for the distribution of foods - typically supermarkets - that now represents this 
barren plain. Residents of these food deserts must travel to more plentifully stocked areas of the 
city in order to find food. 
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Currently, the correlates of supermarket locations are generally agreed upon (c.f. 
Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, Story, & Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009). 
Supermarkets are less common (and food deserts are more likely to exist) in urban areas with 
higher rates of poverty, higher proportions of African Americans, and lower average incomes 
(Algert, Agrawal, & Lewis, 2009; Lee & Lim, 2009; Moore & Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 
2002; Powell et al., 2007; Zenk et al., 2005). Much of this research on supermarket location 
implies that the correlates of supermarket placement are their causes: food deserts exist due to 
the demographics of the area. It is surprising the previous research seems content to simply 
conclude ‘these types of neighborhoods will just be underserved by supermarkets unless their 
demographics (or the effects of demographics) are changed’. Many times – instead of 
investigating causes of relationships – public health researchers simply take neighborhood 
relationships as a given (or natural) and suggest possible interventions to curb these 
relationships. Yet, in this case, without an understanding of the broader causes of supermarket 
location we are left without lasting avenues to combat the problem of being underserved that 
some neighborhoods experience (i.e. only ‘band-aid’ approaches).Would we attempt to eliminate 
diabetes by looking at the demographics of those with diabetes and suggest treatment? Or would 
we examine and intervene in the underlying reason why certain types of people tend to more 
often get diabetes? Why is it that we tend to take the former approach for public health research 
and interventions into neighborhoods? Few studies examine potential variations in the correlates 
of supermarket location patterns (e.g. variation across historical or city contexts); However, 
understanding why variations in the correlates of supermarket location occur (e.g. variation 
across historical or city contexts) should elaborate the causes of, and possible solutions to, 
underserved neighborhoods. 
18 
 
Cities and organizations Moderate Neighborhood Effects 
The issue of ‘neighborhood effects’ – at least the characteristics and effects of high 
poverty, high percent African American neighborhoods (i.e. ghettos) – was taken up in a 
‘Symposium on the Ghetto’ (2008). Both Mario Luis Small and Herbert Gans argue that the 
concept of the Ghetto hides more that it elaborates about social phenomena. Small (2008) argues 
that the term ‘ghetto’, among other things, hides the heterogeneity of poor African American 
neighborhoods and tends to take the state as a homogenous force despite the variety of 
government interventions affecting low income areas across cities. To take this point more 
generally, the ‘neighborhood effect’ model tends to assume that spatial and temporal variations 
in the demographics of the landscape lead to similar spatial and temporal variations in 
neighborhood characteristics
4
 – including the presence of organizations. 
Recent research has shown that the relationship between demographics and the presence 
of organizations is not necessarily affected by 'the market': variations in the presence of 
organizations exist across neighborhoods with similar 'demand' demographics. For example, 
Small and McDermott (2006) present a (city) ‘conditional perspective’ of organization 
placement patterns. Specifically, they argue that the relationship between the demographics and 
the number of organizations of a neighborhood is moderated
5
 by the characteristics of the city in 
which the neighborhood resides. Looking at 2000 national data, Small and McDermott (2006) 
show that the zip code placement patterns of 10 organizations (including supermarkets) in 
                                                          
4
 Among others, Burawoy et al. (2000), Gottdiene (1988), Hannerz (1992), Lloyd (2006) and 
Logan and Molotch (1987) – in their own way – all argue that urban ecology's "focus on local 
system obscures the importance of broader social and historical forces" (Lloyd, 2006: 31). 
5
 "A moderator variable is one that influences the strength of a relationship between two other 
variables, and a mediator variable is one that explains the relationship between the two other 
variables." (Baron and Kenny, 1986) 
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relation to the percent of people in poverty of the zip code depends on which region of the U.S. 
the city is in and the poverty rate of the city as a whole. This study empirically demonstrates that 
the relationship between demographics and the presence of organizations is not necessarily 
affected by 'the market'. Rather, city dynamics moderate the relationship between demographics 
(in this case poverty) and the presence of organizations. A graphical representation of this ‘city 
contingency model’ is presented in Figure 2. In this sense, the 'neighborhood effect' of living in 
poverty on resident outcomes related to lacking organizations may be better understood as a 'city 
effect'.
6
  
Similarly, scholars are beginning to seriously question the role of organizations in 
moderating neighborhood effects. For example, speaking of neighborhood effects, Herbert Gans 
(2009: 10) argues that “even in the very poorest areas, the deleterious effects of poverty are not 
caused by the neighborhood, but by institutions, most of them outside the neighborhood, that 
initiate or perpetuate poverty and conditions associated with it”.7 McQuarrie & Marwell (2009) 
                                                          
6
 Other theorists have rejected the urban ecological notion that cities are constructed through the 
natural competition of neighborhoods and focus on the city-level dynamics affecting 
neighborhoods. Logan and Molotch’s (1987) political economic theory of cities argues that when 
looking at the way land is dealt with we should not simply look at the demographics of the 
neighborhood but the specific interests associated with the neighborhood. In their theory, Logan 
and Molotch claim local elites with various interests (but a common interest in increasing the 
land value of the city) work in concert to increase the economic viability of a city. In terms of 
racially and economically segregated areas, then, we must ask about the interests involved (or 
not involved) in these areas. For instance, gentrification strategists, developers creating retail-
centered areas, or those interested in dissuading the long-term costs of health care may all have 
interests in the way racially and economically segregated areas are invested in by businesses. 
Different cities have different interests involved in areas that may have similar demographics – it 
is the interests of city elites that are involved in these areas that, at the very least indirectly, 
determine supermarket location pattern. 
7
 The idea that the logic of industries affects space is also theorized by political economists. 
However, research and theory on the way economic logics affect space have focused on how 
labor is produced and exploited in space (e.g. Harvey, 1989; Krugman, 1991; Lloyd 2006) rather 
than how places for the exchange of goods are spatially organized. Theories of production in 
space see cities and businesses organized depending on how they produce goods and services 
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recently showed how research on ‘neighborhood effects’ (among other lines of urban 
scholarship) has viewed organizations as derivative rather than productive of urban social 
relations.
8
  
Recent research and theory has shown that organizational dynamics moderate
9
 the 
relationship between economically disadvantaged areas and negative outcomes for its residents 
(e.g. Allard & Small, 2013; Gans, 2009; Marwell 2007; Also see Warren, 1963). A graphical 
representation of this ‘organizational contingency model’ is presented in Figure 3. For example, 
Marwell and McQuarrie (2013) argue that organizations can integrate – or fail to integrate – 
residents of a neighborhood. Similarly, Marwell (2007) shows how community based 
organizations - and especially the economic and political institutions with which they must 
contend – can moderate the effects of living in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Further, Small 
(2009) shows how organizations moderate the negative effects living in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods have on resident social networks. These studies of non-proximate forces affecting 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rather than viewing the city as organized around the location of goods and services being 
exchanged. While the capitalist mode of production is indeed transparent in the urban landscape, 
we should not assume that the logic of locations of exchange (e.g. retail locations) necessarily 
follows the logic of locations of production (see e.g. David Ricardo vs. Karl Marx on this point). 
Perhaps a stronger critique of political economic theory is that it lacks the ability to investigate 
particular industries and businesses (McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009). Political economy claims 
historical epochs of capitalist accumulation to which all industries follow. Industries (and 
organizations) are seen as passive bystanders to grand logics of capital accumulation. I argue 
here that new institutionalism should be used to understand how institutional environments are 
productive in the spatial organization of places for the exchange of goods. 
8
 McQuarrie & Marwell (2009) then elaborate a sturcturation theory that includes both 
organizations and neighborhoods as mutually productive. 
9
 Organizations can also mediate neighborhood effects. That is, organizations can also explain 
the relationship between demographics and resident outcomes. For example, the presence of 
supermarkets can partly mediate (help explain) the relationship between neighborhood poverty 
and poor resident health. It has not been suggested the presence of supermarkets influences the 
strength of the relationship between neighborhood poverty and resident health (i.e. no one has 
argued there is a relationship between poverty and health independent from the presence of 
supermarkets, but this relationship is strengthened or weakened by the independent influence of 
the presence of supermarkets). 
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neighborhood relationships challenge the urban ecology and related ‘neighborhood effect’ 
models. The material and symbolic resources of neighborhoods (e.g. the presence of 
supermarkets) are not necessarily derivative of the proximate ‘functioning’ of a neighborhood. 
Neighborhood relationships are not self-contained but are moderated by extra-local factors. If the 
effect of neighborhood disadvantage on the outcomes of neighborhood residents depends on 
(non-proximate) organizational dynamics, we can hardly talk about these negative outcomes on 
residents as specifically neighborhood effects; rather, the impact of the neighborhood on 
residents may be better thought of as an ‘organizational’ effect.  
The modified understanding of ‘neighborhood effects’ represented by this recent research 
- as moderated by cities and organizations - has important policy implications. Corresponding 
with the neighborhood effects model of explanation, Federal and State policy since the 1990s has 
tended to follow the market-driven explanation of neighborhood effects.
10
 If the problems of a 
neighborhood stem from concentrated disadvantage, the answer is to change the demographics of 
the neighborhood by promoting (or creating) a mixed-income environment (this ‘neighborhood 
effects’ understanding of policy interventions is depicted graphically in Figure 4). However, 
projects such as these (e.g. Hope VI, Empowerment Zone initiative) tend to promote 
gentrification (c.f. Hyra, 2013; Also see Deener, 2012; Zukin et al. 2009 for how class coded 
retail promotes gentrification). It is often the case that the truly disadvantaged do not benefit 
from the arrival of organizations in their communities, but are instead displaced. A city and 
organization moderation model of explanation would suggest policies that modify city and 
                                                          
10
 Sampson (2012) is a bit different in that he argues we should not necessarily move people 
(since this will hide temporarily hide the impact of neighborhoods) but create policies that 
facilitate open movement across neighborhoods or effect mediating processes of neighborhoods. 
I (and other city and organization moderation researchers) would instead argue that focusing on 
neighborhood dynamics misses the fact these dynamics are moderated by extra-local factors. 
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organization dynamics. This ‘organizational contingency’ understanding of policy interventions 
is depicted graphically in Figure 4. Instead of modifying neighborhood demographics, 
modifying organizational (or other non-proximate) causes of neighborhood organizational 
scarcity may prove a better solution; at the very least it would provide solutions that are focused 
on specific problems instead of a vague ‘general well-being’ of neighborhoods. More important 
though, by focusing on non-proximate causes instead of demographics causes, city and 
organization based policies would be much less likely to displace the existing residents of 
neighborhoods.  
 
Changes in Urban Neighborhoods, 1970-1990 
The neighborhood effects approach to explanation has also been used in studies of the 
changes in demographics that have occurred in urban areas from 1970 to 1990. Analogous to the 
urban ecological perspective, it has been largely assumed that historical variations in the 
demographics of neighborhoods corresponded with variations in resource deprivation. As Small 
and Newman (2001:24) point out, “most sociologists agree that (a) urban poverty changed over 
the 1970s and 1980s and that (b) it became more concentrated. But there are marked differences 
in how sociologists think about these two issues”. 
Drake and Cayton (1945) were the first of the Chicago school to focus on the unique 
characteristics of African American neighborhoods. Drake and Cayton showed that African 
Americans could not assimilate into non-African American neighborhoods the way other races 
could. However, in the 1930s (in Chicago) African American neighborhoods were vertically 
integrated by class; this vertical class integration lead to ‘socially organized’ predominantly 
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African American neighborhoods with the associated material and symbolic resources needed by 
residents (e.g. the presence of businesses and other organizations). This was the first major study 
of African American neighborhoods since Dubois’s (2010 [1899]) study of Philadelphia. It was 
also one of the last sociological studies of African American neighborhoods until the late 1960s 
[expanding greatly after the mid 1980s, especially after Wilson (1987)]. 
Perhaps the most popular explanation for changes in urban areas from 1970 to 1990 is 
William Julius Wilson’s ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ thesis (Wilson, 1987; Small and McDermott, 
2006 coined the ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ name). Wilson (1987) cites Drake and Cayton 
(1945) to argue that, prior to 1970, predominantly African American neighborhoods had 
sufficient resources, including a great many organizations, due to the fact these neighborhoods 
were class integrated. Then, a combination of black middle income geographic dislocation from 
lower income blacks (due to increased social and political opportunities for middle income 
blacks) and the exodus of the manufacturing jobs from inner-cities during the 1970s and 1980s 
led to a dramatic increase in concentrated inner-city poverty (see also Johnson and Oliver 1991, 
1992; Kasarda 1989). The flight of manufacturing jobs and middle income African Americans 
away from low income African American neighborhoods created ‘socially disorganized’ 
neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty; the functional break down of these 
neighborhoods with concentrated (especially African American) poverty led to an exodus of the 
symbolic and material resources needed by neighborhood residents (e.g. an exodus of 
supermarkets). 
Massey and Denton (1993) argue that Wilson’s argument places too little emphasis on 
the unique plight of African Americans. According to Massey and Denton (1993), African 
Americans are unique in that they cannot assimilate into white neighborhoods due to a historical 
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“series of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors and public policies by which 
whites sought to contain a growing urban black population" (10). This inability to assimilate into 
other neighborhoods is unique for African Americans and leads to an extreme level of social 
isolation and resource deprivation. Even with increased poverty and middle income African 
American movement away from low income African Americans, there would not be such 
disadvantage without the fact that African Americans cannot integrate into White neighborhoods. 
Given the inability to spatially integrate – and the discrimination that leads to a comparative lack 
of material and symbolic resources provided to African Americans – African Americans 
neighborhoods (regardless of income) fair worse than other neighborhoods. In this sense, the 
continued isolation of African American neighborhoods is an important component of continued 
neighborhood disadvantage since 1970 (including a lack of supermarkets). 
Quillian (1999) integrates the theses of Massey and Denton (1993) and Wilson (1987), 
showing that “in the 1970s and 1980s non-poor African Americans were moving into white areas 
fairly rapidly, as Wilson suggests. But the numbers of non-poor African Americans in white and 
non-poor areas have not increased much over time, as Massey and Denton (1993) have shown, 
because of the decline in white population in these neighborhoods (a likely cause of which is 
white flight)”. Quillian’s (1999) and Massey and Denton’s (1993) research of racial segregation 
slightly modify the “deinstitutionalized ghetto” thesis, claiming that along with the income level 
of the area, African American segregation remains a significant factor of the material and 
symbolic resources of a neighborhood (e.g. the presence of supermarkets). 
These theories differently argue how the demographics of urban neighborhoods changed 
from 1970 to 1990. Wilson’s “deinstitutionalized ghetto” thesis places its focus on the 
concentration of poverty in (especially African American) urban neighborhoods. Massey and 
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Denton (1993) focus on the continued significance of African American segregation from whites 
affecting neighborhood resource disparities. Yet both of these theories, by focusing on how 
demographics changed (or did not change), view the demographics of neighborhoods as the 
causes of neighborhood resource disparities. Whether the demographics are African Americans 
or poverty, both theories agree that the demographic make-up of a neighborhood leads to 
particular outcomes for this neighborhood: The lack of material and symbolic resources (e.g. 
supermarkets) poor and racial minority neighborhoods experience are argued to result from the 
proximate lack of ‘social order’ of 'self-contained little worlds’. More recent arguments of how 
cities and organizations moderate neighborhood effects would disagree – the relationship 
between neighborhood demographics (e.g. race or income) and neighborhood resources (e.g. 
supermarkets) varies depending on how cities and organizations affect these neighborhoods.   
It is important to note that there was not an active research agenda negating the 
importance of cities and organizations on the resources of neighborhoods (though see Wacquant, 
2008). Instead, urban sociologists have been much more concerned with why poor African 
American areas became or remained disadvantaged after the civil rights movement (e.g. Wilson 
1987; Massey and Denton 1993); Similarly, more recent scholarship has focused on proving that 
'place matters' because neighborhoods have distinct effects on individuals independent of the 
attributes of individuals, including why an individual chooses to live in a certain neighborhood 
(Sampson et al. 2002) or generally combating the dominance of methodological individualism 
(Sampson, 2012). The fact that neighborhoods with similar demographics may have different 
levels of resources depending on how they are acted upon by cities and organizations was just 
not an important topic: it was simply assumed that understanding the causes of demographic 
patterns and the ways neighborhoods independently effect individuals is primary to 
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understanding disparities in resources across neighborhoods (also see McQuarry and Marwell, 
2009). 
Yet this inattention to the moderating impact of cities and industries on neighborhood 
resource disparity is problematic. While concentrated poverty and racial segregation are in 
themselves important components of disadvantage (c.f. Sampson, 2012), organizations and cities 
can affect how resources are distributed across neighborhoods with similar demographics. Some 
poor and racial minority areas are better off than other areas due to the moderating impact of 
cities and organizations (Marwell, 2007; Small & McDermott, 2006; Small, 2009); in this sense, 
the lack of resources poor and racial minority areas experience may be less of a neighborhood 
effect and more of a city or organization effect. Studies of extra-local moderation should lead to 
more nuanced and, even better, more optimistic explanations of neighborhood resource 
disparities: neighborhoods with particular demographics are not doomed unless changed but can 
be ‘reinstitutionalized’ with city and organization based policies. This dissertation develops and 
empirically demonstrates two new theories of how cities and industries moderate the relationship 
between presence of supermarkets and the demographics (particularly the economics and 
percentage of African Americans) of a neighborhood. 
 
New Institutionalism Moderates Neighborhood Effects 
First, this dissertation suggests that ‘new institutionalism’ theory (c.f. Greenwood, 2008) 
should be used to investigate the causes of, and possible solutions to, the scarcity of 
organizations (and the resources they provide) in economically disadvantaged areas. New 
institutionalism points out that organizations do not operate independently but do so within an 
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institutional environment (such as an industry). In this institutional environment, organizations 
must take into account other organizations when acting in order to survive. Such actions include 
adhering to norms or establishing legitimacy within an institutional environment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
As urban-oriented research has more recently demonstrated (e.g. Marwell 2007; Small, 
2009), the interactions/relations of organizations moderate the operations and effects of 
organizations on neighborhoods; these interactions/relations can also include institutional 
environments (e.g. industries). It is suggested here that institutional environments moderate the 
scarcity of organizations within economically disadvantaged areas. A graphical representation of 
this ‘institutional environment contingency’ model of neighborhood effects is presented in 
Figure 6. Especially where organizational resources are concerned, organizations are not passive 
actors in the construction of neighborhoods (or derivative of the ‘functioning’ of such 
neighborhoods) (McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009); rather, institutional environments are the 
context in which the demographic attributes of neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted 
upon by organizations.  
The concept of an institutional logic (c.f. Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) is used 
here to demonstrate how institutional environments moderate the relationship between 
neighborhood demographics and the presence of organizations. “Institutional logics are the 
socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and 
rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999:804).11 
                                                          
11
 The institutional logic model conceptualizes society as an inter-institutional system (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) argue that institutional logics come together to 
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Variations in the way institutional logics are formed have implications for the operations of the 
actors within an institution environment (e.g. businesses within an industry). For instance, 
institutional logics can “influence how organizational actors perceive corporate policies, 
affecting firm-level adoption of policies and structures and field-level changes in prevailing 
organizational practices” (Zajac and Westphal, 2004:434). Organizational practices, influenced 
by historically contingent institutional logics, can explicitly or implicitly affect the ways in 
which neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. 
The concept of an institutional logic is particularly appealing for historical studies of 
neighborhood effects (e.g. Rast 2012). A graphical representation of this ‘institutional logic / 
historical moderation model of neighborhood effects is presented in Figure 7. In studies of 
institutional logics, changes in the causes and effects of independent variables across time 
periods are used to demonstrate and analyze changes in institutional logics across these time 
periods (e.g. Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999:807). As 
previously stated, William Julius Wilson’s (1996) ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ hypothesis 
assumes that neighborhood demographic changes caused changes in neighborhood resources 
over time – especially increased concentrations of poverty. The ‘neighborhood effect’ model of 
explanation would also predict that neighborhood demographic changes led to changes in the 
presence of organizations
12
. Conversely, a study of institutional moderation would predict that 
the relationship between neighborhood demographics and neighborhood resources changed 
historically as the institutional logic of related institutions (e.g. industries) historically changed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
operate at the level of individuals, organizations, industries and society. My analysis focuses on 
the grocery industry; though I also indicate how society wide changes influenced the change in 
the institutional logic of this industry. 
12
 Changes in the presence of organizations would then change resident outcomes, though I do 
not have the data to empirically examine this second component of the neighborhood effects 
model.  
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In this, researchers can examine whether relationships between neighborhood demographics and 
resources are stable over time (as would be predicted in the ‘neighborhood effects’ model and 
the deinstitutionalized ghetto thesis) or whether there are historically contingent institutional 
causes of historically contingent relationships between neighborhood demographics and 
resources. Examining supermarket location patterns over time, this dissertation hypothesizes the 
latter.  
 
Minority Competition Moderates Neighborhood Effects 
Second, this dissertation suggests that ‘minority competition’ theory (Blalock, 1967) 
should be used to investigate the causes of, and possible solutions to, the relationship between 
the presence of organizations and the percentage of African Americans in the neighborhood. As 
previously stated, following Drake and Cayton (1945) Wilson (1987) argues that prior to 1970 
African American neighborhoods were not underserved by organizations due to the class 
integration of African American neighborhoods. Wilson then argues the exodus of the African 
American middle class from low income African Americans after the civil rights movement led 
to predominantly poor African Americans inner-city neighborhoods. In this, Wilson’s argument 
means that the percentage of African Americans in a neighborhood is only a meaningful 
neighborhood attribute when African Americans lack economic resources. Massey and Denton 
(1993) disagree with Wilson (and by extension Drake and Cayton) arguing that predominantly 
African American neighborhoods have/had fewer resources even when controlling for income. 
Massey and Denton (1993) show how (after 1900) the "black ghetto was constructed through a 
series of well-defined institutional practices, private behaviors and public policies by which 
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whites sought to contain a growing urban black population” (10). African Americans are unique 
in that they cannot assimilate into white neighborhoods due the historical and continued presence 
of institutional racism.  
I follow Massey and Denton (1993) in taking the percentage of African Americans as an 
independent predictor of the presence of organizations. As others have shown (c.f. Beaulac, 
Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, Story, & Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009), controlling 
for income, as the percentage of African Americans in a zip code increases there is a (statistically 
significant) decrease in the number of supermarkets in the zip code. However, following the 
‘conditional perspective’ of neighborhood effects (e.g. Small and McDermott, 2006; Small, 
2009) I argue that there are city level moderating effects on the relationship between the 
presence of organizations and the percentage of African Americans in a neighborhood.
13
 The 
historical and continued presence of institutional racism that leads to the scarcity of 
organizations in African American neighborhoods is moderated by city (racial) dynamics.  
The ‘contingency theory’ of neighborhood effects suggests significant variation across 
cities in the ways supermarkets locate relative to the percentage African Americans in a 
neighborhood (see Figure 2 for a graphical representation of this model). Some cities may have 
no relationship or even a positive relationship between African Americans and supermarkets. 
Understanding variations between cities should help to illuminate city level policies that can 
alleviate disparities in the distribution of resource across neighborhoods that are simply due to 
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 In large part, urban regime theory (Stone 1989) and urban political economy (Logan and 
Molotch 1987) ignore the independent effects of racial dynamics, viewing race as one 
component to consider in the pursuit of the economic interests of local elites who govern cities 
(Kraus 2004). As a group conflict theory in its own right, minority competition theory can be 
studied along with urban regime and urban political economy theories to investigate the unequal 
distribution of resources in cities across (racial) groups. 
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the number of African Americans in a neighborhood. In answering the ‘city contingency’ 
question, I hypothesize that ‘minority competition theory’ (Blalock 1967) helps explain how city 
characteristics (specifically, the percentage of African Americans in the city) moderate the 
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and number of supermarkets of a zip 
code. 
 
Minority competition theory 
Massey and Denton (1993) argued that the ‘black ghetto’ - and the social isolation and 
related spatial discrimination against African Americans - was an intentionally developed 
construct that persists today. Minority competition theory (Blalock, 1967) is similar in that it 
argues discrimination against African Americans is an intentionally developed phenomenon. 
However, minority competition theory argues that discrimination against African Americans 
stems from the perceived threat of African Americans by Whites when the number of African 
Americans grows large. That is, the theory generally agrees with Massey and Denton but argues 
that city level group threat dynamics moderate discrimination (such as resource disparities). 
In essence, minority competition theory states that as a minority group becomes a greater 
threat to the resources of the majority group, this majority group will increasingly use 
discriminatory means to maintain resources.
14
 While there are other factors involved in the threat 
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 The current study lacks measures of motivations to discriminate (though possibilities for future 
conceptualizations and measurements are presented in the conclusion); however, while measures 
of motivations to discriminate should be desired where available (e.g. Quillian, 1996; Stults and 
Baumer, 2007), Blalock (1967) argues that by studying how the percentage of minorities relates 
to unequal outcomes between groups we can infer how discrimination occurs (Also see for 
example Behrens, Uggen and Manza 2003; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Welch and Payne 
2010). 
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minorities pose to the majority, a higher percentage of minorities is largely understood as the 
primary way minorities will provoke a perceived threat in the majority. That is, as the percentage 
of minorities increase, this increase will provoke a greater motivation by the majority to hoard 
resources away from this minority group. However, since discrimination is cumulative, as the 
percentage of minorities grows the minority group will become less of a threat (due to their 
greater handicap). For example, a 5% minority increase will create a greater degree of inequality 
going from 10-15% compared to 30-35% (Blalock 1967:147-150). Continuing with this idea, as 
others have noted (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Turk 1969), as the percentage of minorities becomes 
large, they will be able to gain some ability to attenuate the already high effects of 
discrimination. As such, minority competition theory predicts a non-linear relationship (a 
decreasing then slightly reversing slope) between the percentage of minorities and resource 
inequality. 
Recent research on minority competition has typically focused on the effect of the 
percentage of minorities on punishment practices (also called punishment power by Blalock). 
While not universally supported, minority competition theory
15
 has explained how increases in 
the percentage of minorities relates to such phenomena as police use of deadly force (Chamlin 
1989), the death penalty (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), interracial killings (Jacobs and Wood 
1999), high school punitiveness (Welch and Payne 2010) and disenfranchisement (Behrens, 
Uggen and Manza 2003). Despite this large body of research there are few studies on the impact 
of minority competition on the unequal distribution of resources across groups (also called 
                                                          
15
 There have been a few variations on Blalock’s (1967) early work on minority competition 
theory (Eitle, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2002) as well as Blumer’s (1958) earlier theory that 
discrimination and prejudice are contingent upon group position (and feelings of privilege and 
threat that arise from group positioning). I focus on Blalock’s (1967) theory to avoid too much 
confusion between theories with slight variations. 
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reward power by Blalock). Although it was also theorized to predict unequal economic 
outcomes, minority competition research incorporating economic indicators tends to use them as 
causal variables of motivations to discriminate: also known as ‘economic threat’ (e.g. Bonacich 
1972; Eitle, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 2002; Olzak 1990; Parker, Stults, Rice 2005; Stults and 
Baumer 2007). The minority competition theory elaborated by Blalock conflates economic 
indicators as both causes of motivations to discriminate and as outcomes of the competitive 
threat minorities pose that motivate discrimination. Though future theorizing should attempt to 
do so, this dissertation does not elaborate how to separate economic indicators as causes and 
effects of motivations to discriminate. This dissertation simply points out that the minority 
competition process can prove useful in understanding city level moderating causes of the 
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of supermarkets in a 
neighborhood.  
 
 
Minority competition: The current study 
It is important to stress that this dissertation does not empirically investigate whether 
historical changes in cities affected changes in the relationship between demographics (African 
Americans) and the presence of organizations. I do not have a large enough sample of cities 
(nine cities were sampled from 1970 to 1990) to examine whether changes in the percentage of 
African Americans effected changes in the relationship between African Americans and the 
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presence of organization. Future research would be wise to look at ‘neighborhood within city’ 
minority competition dynamics historically.
16
 
Using 2010 U.S. national data, this dissertation examines whether the relationship 
between African Americans and the number of supermarkets in a zip code depends on the 
proportion of African Americans in a city in a U-Shaped pattern described by minority 
competition theory. Based on recent research confirming minority competition dynamics at the 
level of cities still predicts discrimination against African Americans (e.g. Behrens, Uggen and 
Manza 2003; Jacobs and Wood 1999), this dissertation predicts this to be the case. While lacking 
a historical component, my analysis of 2010 national data still speaks to the ‘neighborhood 
effects’ model of explanation: that the relationship between African Americans and supermarkets 
is moderated by city dynamics. Similarly, agreeing with Massey and Denton (1993), though 
contrary to Wilson (1987; 1996), this dissertation argues the percentage of African Americans in 
a neighborhood has an effect on the presence of organizations, independent of income. However, 
modifying Massey and Denton's thesis, I use minority competition theory to show that the 
                                                          
16
 It is possible Drake and Cayton were misled by a small sample size. Drake and Cayton only 
focus on Chicago and, as Small (2009) notes, it is unwise to focus on one city to show national 
trends. Using 1950s data, Blalock (1967) showed that discrimination (including disparities in 
resources) against African Americans depended on the proportion of African Americans in the 
city as a whole. Drake and Cayton's study took place in the late 1930s - before the 2nd great 
migration and the large influx of African Americans into Chicago (and the Mid-west more 
generally). In this, Drake and Cayton may have been misled by only looking at Chicago which, 
at the time, had a low total percentage of African Americans. Per minority competition theory, 
the small amount of African Americans in Chicago in the 1930s may explain the relative 
affluence of African American neighborhoods. Further, the increase in African Americans in 
northeast and mid-west cities during the second great migration (1940 to 1970) and the continued 
large numbers into the 1970s and 1980s may be another – though in this case city contingent – 
component of the continued structural racism experienced by African Americans after the civil 
rights movement (Massey and Denton, 1993). If minority competition theory is correct, future 
research could show that changes the proportion of African Americans across cities changed the 
presence of organizations (and/or other resources) in largely African American neighborhoods. 
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relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of organizations in a 
neighborhood depends on the city in which it resides. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the massive literature on ‘food deserts’ and massive history of urban sociological 
research and theory, these two literatures have evaded each other. Instead of elaborating ‘food 
deserts’ as a more general (urban) problem of neighborhood resource disparities, the (largely 
public health) ‘food desert’ literature has tended to take the correlates of supermarket location as 
their cause. This dissertation incorporates urban sociological theory into the study of food deserts 
in order to better understand the causes of the presence of supermarkets in neighborhoods (or 
lack thereof). 
This dissertation argues that the ‘neighborhood effect’ explanations of the lack of 
material and symbolic resources in low income and high percentage African American 
neighborhoods – specifically disparities in the presence of supermarkets –are insufficient.  
Despite their differences, current policies attempting to attract resource to underserved areas 
(Hyra, 2013), research on food deserts (c.f. Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, 
Story, & Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009) the ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ hypothesis (Wacquant 
2008; Wilson, 1996) and the hypothesis of the continuing significance of race (Massey and 
Denton, 1993) all follow the ‘neighborhood effect’ model of the location of organizations: 
particular demographics cause the location of organizations and these relationships between 
organization location and demographics remain stable over time. Following previous research on 
the effect of cities and organizations on neighborhood resources (e.g. Marwell, 2007; Small and 
McDermott, 2006; Small, 2009) this dissertation develops and empirically demonstrates two 
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theories of how cities and industries moderate the presence of supermarkets in economically 
disadvantaged and African American zip codes. 
First, this dissertation shows how ‘new institutionalism’ (c.f. Greenwood, 2008; 
Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) can be used to investigate the causes of, and possible 
solutions to, the scarcity of organizations (and the resources they provide) in low income areas. It 
is argued that historically contingent institutional logics are the context in which neighborhoods 
are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. This theory will be empirically 
examined by investigating the impact of the grocery industry on the relationship between 
supermarkets and demographics during the years of the ‘urban crisis’ (1970 to 1990).  
Second, this dissertation argues that minority competition theory helps explain the 
negative relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of 
supermarkets in a zip code. I do not have enough of a sample of cities to investigate city level 
variations in the relationship between supermarkets and demographics during the urban crisis. 
Instead, I use a national sample of cities in 2010 to demonstrate how cities moderate the 
relationship between the presence of supermarkets and the percentage of African Americans in a 
zip code. Using 2010 U.S. national data, I hypothesize that at low levels of African Americans in 
a city there is low ‘perceived threat’ and low inequality in the placement of supermarkets; 
further, as the percentage of African Americans in the city increases, supermarkets are 
increasingly located away from African Americans; however, at high levels of African 
Americans in a city, the increasing unequal distribution of supermarkets away from African 
Americans declines – theoretically due to the cumulative effect of discrimination and the 
increased ability to attenuate discrimination when numbers are high. These results will indicate 
whether cities moderate relationships between zip code demographics and resources and suggest 
future research for city level (historical) studies of neighborhood resource disparities. 
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Generally speaking, the results of this dissertation will have important implications for 
both theory and policy regarding on ‘food deserts’ and neighborhood resource disparities more 
generally. This dissertation suggests that the ‘neighborhood effects’ explanation of the presence 
of organizations in neighborhoods can be better understood as ‘city and/or industry’ (or more 
generally ‘extra-local’) effects. In the same respect, instead of attempting to change the 
demographics of neighborhoods to solve neighborhood resource disparities – the most widely 
used policy tactic (c.f. Hyra, 2013) – policy makers would likely do better to change the city and 
industry causes of these disparities.   
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CHAPTER III 
A HISTORICAL ERA OF FOOD DESERTS: CHANGES IN THE CORRELATES OF 
URBAN SUPERMARKET LOCATION, 1970-1990 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter investigates whether the correlates of supermarket location change over time. Data 
are collected from 1970 and 1980 city directories and unofficial data from the 1990 census zip 
business patterns. ‘Separate year’ and ‘differenced data’ models investigate changes in the 
correlates of supermarket placement in nine U.S. urban areas from 1970 to 1990. Results show 
that, controlling for population and the percentage of African Americans, in 1970 supermarkets 
were more likely to locate in urban areas with higher poverty and lower income. This pattern of 
store placement gradually reversed from 1970 to 1990. 
 
As stated in chapter 2, previous research has largely agreed upon the correlates of 
supermarket placement (Beaulac et al., 2009; Larson et al., 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009; McKinnon 
et al., 2009). Focusing on urban areas, supermarkets are much less common (and food deserts 
more commonly exist) in urban areas with a higher percentage of those in poverty, a higher 
proportion of African Americans, and a populous with lower income (Algert et al., 2009; Lee 
and Lim, 2009; Moore and Diez Roux, 2006; Morland et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2007; Zenk et 
al., 2005). Much of this research on ‘food deserts’ implies that the correlates of supermarket 
placement are their causes: food deserts exist due to the demographics of the area.  
More generally, as discussed in Chapter 2, despite their differences, the food desert 
literature, policies attempting to attract supermarkets into underserved areas, the 
‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ hypothesis (Wilson, 1996) and the hypothesis of the continuing 
significance of race (Massey and Denton, 1993) all follow the ‘neighborhood effect’ model of 
the location of organizations: particular demographics cause the location of organizations and 
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these relationships between organization location and demographics remain stable over time. 
That is, these theories assume that in order to decipher or change the location of organizations 
one should investigate differences in demographics across neighborhoods either spatially or 
temporally. 
In contrast to the aforementioned theories, this dissertation hypothesizes that the 
neighborhood demographic correlates of supermarkets changed over time. This chapter examines 
whether urban supermarket locations were consistently predicted by levels of income and the 
percentage of poverty and African Americans in a neighborhood or if there was a historical shift 
in these relationships from 1970 to 1990. Chapter 4 will empirically demonstrate why the 
correlates of supermarket placement changed over time. This chapter simply asks whether the 
neighborhood correlates of supermarkets are historically contingent. In empirically investigating 
the question of historical contingency, this chapter identifies whether the correlates of food 
deserts (and perhaps the investment patterns of organizations more broadly) should be 
considered as historical phenomena. If the correlates of urban food deserts are historically 
contingent, the focus on affecting neighborhood demographics (or the presumed effects of these 
demographics) to attract supermarkets would only mask the broader historical causes of food 
deserts; instead, researchers and policy makers should attempt to identify and resolve the 
historical causes of the problematic relationships between demographics and (a lack of) 
supermarkets. 
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Methods 
Data and Variables 
The unit of analysis in this study is the five digit zip code, which is to be preferred over 
census tracts for economic activity (Bingham and Zhongcai, 2001; Small and McDermott, 2006). 
Difficulties may arise when investigating changes in zip codes over time. Zip codes are 
categories for grouping mailing addresses and are not defined by geographic location. When a 
zip code changes its definition it does not change its name like a census tract. As such, 
examining a zip code over time can lead to a dramatically different defined area for the same zip 
code (Krieger et al., 2002). This limitation is not a problem when analyzing differences in 
independent models for each year; however, when investigating changes in specific zip codes 
over time a stationary zip code is mandatory. While zip code boundaries are relatively stable 
(Adams, 2007a) potential shifts in zip code boundaries are dealt with by looking for and 
excluding outliers in models utilizing data from more than one year.
17
 Eliminating outliers acts 
as a defense against changing zip code boundaries since any dramatic change in a zip code 
boundary will correspond with a dramatic change in its attributes. 
Data come from three sources. Data for the number of supermarkets per zip code in 1970 
and 1980 come from a sample of City Directories.
18
 City directories do not include surrounding 
                                                          
17
 Two zip codes were eliminated from the 1970 to 1980 data: Zip code 75232 added 62% black 
along with a high change in HH income. In zip code 98107 population decreased by 34k, the 
next closest was 23k. One zip code was eliminated from the 1980 to 1990 data: In zip code 
38127 population decreased by -43k, the next closest was 16k. 
18
 City directories are to be preferred over yellow pages. City directories are funded through 
subscription, meaning information about businesses are collected by a canvass of businesses and 
“is compiled in a way to insure maximum accuracy”. Yellow page listings are paid for by the 
businesses who wish to be included in the classified sections. (Arrowhead Public Library System 
41 
 
suburbs and thus the analysis only applies to urban areas. Nine urban areas were sampled with a 
total of 207 zip codes per year. The sample includes the following nine urban areas (with the 
number of zip codes in parenthesis): Buffalo, NY (20), Dallas, TX (36), Indianapolis, IN (17), 
Kansas City, MO (32), Memphis, TN (17), Milwaukee, WI (25), Nashville, TN (14), San 
Francisco, CA (23) and Seattle, WA (23). Following previous research on the importance of 
region (e.g. Wilson, 1996) about half of the cities come from the Northeast and Midwest (5) 
compared to the South and West. Also, following Massey and Denton’s (1993) influential book 
American Apartheid, about half of the cities (5) had black-white ‘hyper-segregation’.19 
The grocery section of city directories also includes convenience stores. The Super 
Market News 1970 and 1983 Distribution Study of Supermarket Sales were used to identify the 
supermarkets in these city directories (Supermarket News, 1970; 1983). In these Super Market 
News Distribution studies information about supermarkets are defined and reported by 
newspapers in these markets. Methods of compiling estimates vary, from detailed surveys to 
knowledge about the market based on checks among food representatives, brokers or stores, or 
informed opinion (Supermarket News, 1970). Section 1 of the Distribution Study of Supermarket 
Sales shows the leading supermarkets for the top 50 Standard Metropolitan Areas broken down 
by the following categories: Leading chains, leading convenience stores chains, leading 
independents and voluntary or cooperative groups; convenience stores are also noted with a ‘C’ 
when appropriate. Only the non-convenience stores listed in either the 1970 or 1983 Distribution 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2003) This means those working at the yellow pages do not actively seek out businesses to make 
their information as complete as possible. 
19
 I control for the city level variables of (1) hyper-segregation and (2) the northeast and Midwest 
vs. the south and west. However, I do not examine how these city level variables moderate 
relationships between zip code demographics and supermarkets. Preliminary analyses suggest 
relationships between demographics and supermarkets are similar across these city level 
variables (and thus not significant) – however, the sample size is too small to make reliable 
estimates and reliably rule out the possibility of the significance of these city level variables.  
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Study of Supermarket Sales were counted. Every effort was made to verify that the stores listed 
in the Supermarket News Distribution study were supermarkets and not convenience stores. 
While this will not cover all supermarkets (especially independent stores with only one location) 
it is a conservative measure of supermarkets.
20
 
Data for the number of supermarkets per zip code in 1990 comes from an unofficial 
21
 
dataset of the Census bureau’s ‘Zip Business Patterns’ series (official data only extends back to 
1994). A letter provided by the census states that “every attempt has been made to update and 
correct the ZIP Codes in the base file; however, some 5-digit ZIP Codes could be incorrect... 
They are not to be cited or presented in any way as official statistics developed by the Census.” 
The Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 5411 for ‘grocery stores’ is used to count grocery stores. 
Establishments under this SIC also include convenience stores. Previous work has distinguished 
convenience stores from supermarkets in the SIC 5411 category by using only stores with over 
50 employees as supermarkets (Alwitt and Donley, 1997; Apparicio et al., 2007; Moore and Diez 
Roux, 2006). While this will not pick up small stores and should be understood as the number of 
‘supermarkets’ rather than ‘grocery stores’ it is a conservative measure of supermarkets. This 
coding method is followed here. 
                                                          
20
 Measures that included all stores in the Supermarket News distribution study, any store with 
‘Super Market’ in the name and stores that had more than 3 establishments in one city in either 
1970 or 1980 that, when investigated, showed to be supermarkets were also investigated. This 
led to similar findings except that the statistical significance and R-square of the models 
increased (e.g. in 1970 poverty is significant at the 0.001 level instead of the 0.1 level). 
21
 Per the letter provided by the census: “Every attempt has been made to update and correct the 
ZIP Codes in the base file; however, some 5-digit ZIP Codes could be incorrect.  Since this file is 
unedited, the tabulated data will not reflect final corrections from the County Business Patterns 
review and may contain residual errors of transcription or omission not present in official 
statistics.  For these reasons, the data provided are intended for your internal use only.  They are 
not to be cited or presented in any way as official statistics developed by the Bureau of the 
Census.” While the letter says ‘for internal use only’ researchers were informed the data can be 
used in published manuscripts as long as it was made clear the data was not official census data. 
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Data on the demographics of zip codes come from the Census of Population and 
Housing, 1970, 1980 and 1990 extract files (Adams, 2000; 2007a; 2007b). Since the correlation 
between the demographic attributes of a zip code and supermarket location are of interest zip 
codes with fewer than 1000 population were excluded from the analysis (excluding 9 zip codes 
1970, 11 in 1980 and 6 in 1990). Summary statistics for each variable are provided in Table 1. 
The logarithm of population is used “because some neighborhoods are primarily residential, 
while others are primarily business zoned" (Small and McDermott 2006). Mean household 
income is adjusted for inflation over time. In accordance with the census, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' Consumer Price Index is used to adjust for changes in consumer buying power over 
time (U.S. Census, 2012). The percent of people in poverty is used as a separate economic 
measure. Along with a standard percentage, a dummy variable ‘%poverty over 30%’ is used to 
investigate the effect of living in a zip code with concentrated poverty
 
(Ludwig, 1999; Wilson, 
1996). The percent of the population in the zip code that is African American is also examined. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
A series of ‘separate year’ models and ‘differenced data’ models are used in tandem in 
order to examine changes in statistical relationships over time. Conducting separate models for 
each year implicitly tests for interaction effects of the historical time point on the relationships 
between the dependent variable and independent variables (c.f. Brown et al., 2001). However, 
conducting separate models for each year does not control for changes over time in the variables 
involved (differences) as predictors of these changing relationships. Conversely, models with 
‘differenced data’ elaborate how the dependent variable changes in relation to initial year 
44 
 
independent variables and changes in independent variables; yet ‘differenced data’ models 
cannot show whether statistical relationships between variables change over time.  
Using a series of ‘separate year’ models and ‘differenced data’ models together allows 
for an investigation of whether statistical relationships change over time, controlling for changes 
in the variables analyzed. This is accomplished by (1) investigating whether the relationships 
between a dependent variable and independent variables differ across time points (by year 
models) and (2) testing whether changes in a dependent variable is predicted by changes in 
independent variables or the level of an independent variable in the initial year (‘differenced 
data’ models with initial conditions). With these two series of models changes in statistical 
relationships across time points can be explained by how either initial year demographics or 
changes in demographics predict changes in the number of supermarkets across time points. 
Given this strategy, the analysis is separated into two parts: (1) a series of by-year analyses and 
(2) a series of ‘differenced data’ analyses. 
Part 1 
In part 1 of the analysis, the relationship between supermarkets and demographics for 
1970, 1980 and 1990 are analyzed separately. Conducting separate models for each year 
implicitly tests for interaction effects of the historical time period on the relationships between 
the dependent variable and independent variables
 
(Brown et al., 2001). The dependent variable, 
the amount of supermarkets in a zip code, is a simple count based on the coding system 
elaborated above. The distribution of supermarkets is positively skewed due to the larger amount 
of zip codes with a low amount of stores and a finite limit of zero. As a result, these regression 
models are estimated with negative binomial regression (where the conditional variance exceeds 
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the conditional mean). Percent poverty and household income are used in separate models since 
looking at one while controlling for the other makes little sense analytically.  
Part 2 
While part 1 shows whether statistical relationships between the number of supermarkets 
and the demographics of a zip code change over time, it is still unclear whether changes in 
statistical relationships are independent of overall changes in demographics and supermarkets. 
Further, in what manner the number of supermarkets changed in relation to demographics is still 
unclear. Part 2 extends the analysis of changes in the relationships between the number of 
supermarkets and demographics by examining how initial year demographics and changes in 
demographics affect changes in supermarkets.  
Part 2 of the analysis uses the differences of the proceeding year from the preceding year 
(time 2- time 1) for each variable. Summary statistics for the differenced data are shown in 
Table 2. The relationships between the difference in the amount of supermarkets and the 
difference in the demographics of a zip code from one year to the next are investigated. This is 
done for two models: from 1970 to 1980 and then from 1980 to 1990. The impact of initial year 
demographics on changes in supermarkets are also examined. Again, percent poverty and mean 
household income are separated into two separate models because looking at one while 
controlling for the other makes little sense analytically.  
The impact of initial year demographics on changes in supermarkets may be non-linear. 
This is especially true if one category of a demographic explains most of the changes in the 
number of supermarkets (e.g. supermarkets leaving high poverty zip codes at a much higher rate 
than anywhere else, controlling for changes in poverty in these zip codes). To account for non-
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linearity, categories of initial year demographics are incorporated into the models to examine 
whether these particular categories, independent of changes in the demographic, predict changes 
in supermarkets. To account for changes in categories of poverty and household income over 
time the average of the quartiles from the three years examined are calculated and used as 
categories for all models examined.
22
 Static categories of %African American over time are also 
used: low African American population (under 30%), mixed race population (30-70% African 
American) and a high African American population (over 70% African American). Variables are 
coded with three categories where the middle categories of a zip codes in the preceding time 
point are coded as 0 (the reference category), the low categories are coded as 1 and the high 
categories are coded as 2.
23
 These dummy variables test whether the relationship between a 
specific demographic category and the amount of supermarkets change over time, controlling for 
changes in demographics. This analysis leads to a total of eight statistical models for the 2 
‘differenced’ data sets. 
 
Results 
Part 1: By year analysis of the relationships between supermarkets and demographics 
Table 3 summarizes the nine models used to examine the relationship between the 
demographics and the number of supermarkets of zip codes for the years 1970, 1980 and 1990. 
As shown in table 3, logged population is a significant positive predictor of the number of 
                                                          
22
 Average 1
st
 and 3
rd
 quartiles for Household Income (adjusted for the consumer price index): 
36765, 54815. Average 1
st
 and 3
rd
 quartiles for %poverty: 6.25, 22. 
23
 Unless otherwise noted significant categories as three level categorical variables are also 
significant as two level categorical variables; e.g. high income zip codes (1) compared to both 
low income and middle income zip codes combined (0) in 1970 is also a significant predictor of 
changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 1980. 
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supermarkets in a zip code for the year 1970, 1980 and 1990. In fact, logged population is the 
only variable that is consistently significant in all models. The percentage of the zip codes’ 
population that is African American is a consistently negative predictor of supermarket 
placement. While the percentage of African Americans in a zip code is a consistently negative 
predictor over time, this variable is only significant in 1970 when controlling for %poverty and 
in 1990 controlling for household income. 
As shown in table 3, the economic predictors of the number of supermarkets in a zip code 
changed direction over time. There is a significant positive relationship between %poverty and 
the number of supermarkets in 1970. In 1970, for every 10% increase in the %poverty of a zip 
code there was a 20% increase (e
0.18
 = 1.20) in the number of supermarkets in the zip code. This 
relationship between %poverty and supermarkets becomes non-significant (but still positive) in 
1980. In 1990 this relationship between %poverty and the number of supermarkets becomes a 
negative predictor. In 1990, for every 10% increase in the %poverty of a zip code the number of 
supermarkets in the zip code decreases by a factor of 0.795 (e
-0.023
 = 0.795). The changing 
relationship between poverty and supermarkets is also shown by the models with zip codes with 
poverty over 30%: A non-significant and positive relationship in 1970 becomes a non-significant 
and negative relationship in 1980 and then a significant and negative relationship in 1990.  
The mean household income of a zip code also changes direction as a predictor over time. 
The relationship between the mean household income of a zip code and the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code was negative (though non-significant) in 1970. In 1980 this 
relationship between household income and supermarkets became positive (though non-
significant). The relationship between mean household income and the number of supermarkets 
in a zip code remained positive (though still non-significant) in 1990.  
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Part 2: The relationships between changes in supermarkets and changes in demographics 
Part 2a 
Part 2 of the analysis investigates changes in demographics, initial year demographics 
and zip codes categorized by initial year levels of demographics as predictors of the changes in 
supermarkets in zip codes from 1970 to 1980 and 1980 to 1990. Table 4 shows the relationship 
between changes in the demographics of a zip code and changes in the number of supermarkets 
in a zip code, controlling for the demographics of the zip code in the initial year. As shown in 
Table 4, the R-square for each model shows that changes in population, percent African 
American, percent in poverty and mean household income collectively predict changes in 
supermarkets over twice as well from 1970 to 1980 as compared to 1980 to 1990 (about 18% 
variation explained vs. about 8% variation explained).
24
 
Changes in the mean household income and the percent in poverty of a zip code are never 
significant predictors of changes in supermarkets over time. The initial conditions of the percent 
in poverty and the mean household income of zip codes are also not significant for either model. 
A change in population is a significant predictor of changes in the number of supermarkets from 
both 1970 to 1980 and 1980 to 1990 – though in different ways. From 1970 to 1980, for every 
                                                          
24
 Some may point to the 1980-1990 model as evidence that the city directory and unofficial zip 
code business pattern data are dissimilar. However, the coding system reflects a highly 
conservative measure of supermarkets, making it highly unlikely the data captures anything other 
than supermarkets. Systematic under-reporting of supermarkets is also highly unlikely: A 
measure that included all stores in the Supermarket News distribution study, any store with 
‘Supermarket’ in the name and stores that had more than 3 establishments in one city for the 
1980 measure increased the R-square. Further, using a measure of supermarkets with 20 or more 
employees in 1990 decreased the R-square. This low R-square likely reflects a loss in the 
predictive power of demographics on changes in supermarkets. Similar to the 1980-1990 model, 
when analyzing the relationship between changes in supermarkets and changes in demographics 
from 1990-2000 (both from zip business patterns) there was a much smaller R-square and 
predictive ability of variables as compared to the 1970-1980 model. 
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10,000 increase in population there was a 1.32 increase in supermarkets controlling for the 
percent of people in poverty and a 1.38 increase in supermarkets controlling for mean household 
income. From 1980 to 1990, for every 10,000 increase in population there was a 0.70 decrease in 
supermarkets controlling for the percent of people in poverty and a 0.74 decrease in 
supermarkets controlling for mean household income.
25
  
Changes in the percentage of those in the zip code who are African American from 1970 
to 1980 are related to changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 1980. From 1970 to 1980, for every 
10% increase in the percentage of African Americans in the zip code there was a 0.34 decrease in 
supermarkets controlling for the percent of people in poverty and a 0.35 decrease in 
supermarkets controlling for mean household income. Controlling for mean household income, 
the percentage of African Americans in a zip code in 1980 (the initial year) is significantly (at 
the 0.1 level) associated with changes in supermarkets from 1980 to 1990: For every 10% 
increase in the percent of African Americans in a zip code in 1980 there was a 0.41 increase in 
the number of supermarkets from 1980 to 1990; however, this relationship is not significant 
when controlling for the percent in poverty.  
Part 2b 
Table 5 and Table 6 extend the analysis of the effect of initial year demographics on 
changes in supermarkets, controlling for changes in demographics.
26
 Table 5 presents two 
models with a three categorical variable of the percent of the population in who are African 
American in the initial year [30-70% black (0), under 30% black (1), over 70% black]. The first 
                                                          
25
 Future research is needed to explain this result. One possible hypothesis is that supermarkets 
began to favor increasingly commercially dominant zip codes within cities from 1980 to 1990. 
26
 Categorized levels of changes of demographics (e.g. low/medium/high changes in poverty) 
provided no significant results for either time period. 
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model controls for the percent of the population in poverty and the second controls for mean 
household income. As shown in Table 5, whether controlling for household income or percent 
poverty, the three categorical variable %African American in 1970 does not significantly predict 
changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 1980. Further, the three categorical variable %African 
American in 1980 does not significantly predict changes in supermarkets from 1980 to 1990. 
Table 6 includes a model with a dummy variable of three levels of initial year economic 
demographics [the middle two quartiles (0), the lowest quartile (1), and the highest quartile (2)]. 
While changes in mean household income and a ratio variable of 1970 mean household income 
did not significantly predict changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 1980 (see above), zip codes in 
high income areas in 1970 lost significantly more stores from 1970 to 1980 than middle income 
areas. As shown in Table 6, controlling for changes in population, %African American and mean 
household income (along with 1970 logged population and %African American), zip codes that 
were high income in 1970 lost 0.76 fewer supermarkets from 1970 to 1980 compared to middle 
income areas. From 1980 to 1990, compared to middle income zip codes, zip codes that were 
low income in 1980 lost 1.07 more supermarkets. Low income zip codes in 1970 and high 
income zip codes in 1980 did not significantly predict changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 
1980 and 1980 to 1990 respectively. 
Table 6 also provides a model with a three categorical variable of the percent of the 
population in poverty in the initial year. While changes in percent poverty and a ratio variable of 
1970 percent poverty did not significantly predict changes in supermarkets from 1970 to 1980 
(see above), zip codes in low poverty areas in 1970 lost significantly fewer stores from 1970 to 
1980 than middle poverty areas. As shown in Table 6, controlling for changes population, 
%African American and percent poverty (along with 1970 logged population and %African 
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American), zip codes that were low poverty in 1970 lost 0.83 fewer supermarkets from 1970 to 
1980 compared to middle poverty areas. Similarly, compared to middle poverty zip codes, zip 
codes that were low poverty in 1980 lost 1.01 fewer supermarkets from 1980 to 1990.
27
 High 
poverty zip codes in 1970 and 1980 did not significantly predict changes in supermarkets from 
1970 to 1980 and 1980 to 1990 respectively. 
Part 2c 
Table 7 further elaborates changes in the relationships between the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code and the mean household income and the percent poverty of a zip 
code. Table 7 separates %poverty and household income into the bottom, middle two and top 
quartiles to show how the number of supermarkets in low, middle and high income/poverty 
categories changed over time. The top section of table 7 shows the number of supermarkets 
divided by the logarithm of population (to control for population) for each demographic category 
analyzed. The bottom section of table 7 shows the total number of supermarkets for each 
demographic category analyzed.  
In 1970 high income zip codes had the fewest number of supermarkets while middle 
income zip codes had the most. From 1970 to 1980 high income zip codes lost the fewest stores: 
high income zip codes lost 67% fewer stores than middle income zip codes and 120% fewer 
stores than low income zip codes. This uneven decline in stores from 1970 to 1980 across 
                                                          
27
 To make these results more intuitive, take two hypothetical areas: a low poverty and a high 
poverty area. According to theories that argue demographics necessarily cause supermarket 
placement patterns, if both areas were to gain 10% poverty, each area should lose a similar 
amount of supermarkets. The greater increase in poverty in high poverty areas (concentrated 
poverty) is to account for the unequal losses in supermarkets in high poverty areas. The analysis 
here shows that, even if there were equal increases in poverty a zip code in the lowest quartile of 
poverty and highest quartile of poverty, the high poverty area would lose more supermarkets. 
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income categories led to a higher amount of stores per zip code in high income areas compared 
to either middle or low income areas in 1980. Then, from 1980 to 1990, there was a large decline 
of supermarkets in low income zip codes. Low income zip codes lost 1144% more stores than 
middle income zip codes and 229% more stores than high income zip codes from 1980 to 1990. 
However, high income zip codes lost the second most stores from 1980 to 1990. The low amount 
of supermarket losses in middle income zip codes compared to high income zip codes, combined 
with an extremely high amount of supermarket losses in low income zip codes, led to a positive 
relationship between supermarkets and mean household income in 1990. The high number of 
supermarkets in middle income areas throughout also accounts for the non-significant 
relationship between household income and the number of supermarkets in a zip code. 
Table 7 also illustrates the changing relationship between poverty and supermarkets from 
1970 to 1990. In 1970 low poverty zip codes had the fewest number of supermarkets while 
middle poverty zip codes had the most. From 1970 to 1980 high and middle poverty zip codes 
lost a similar amount of supermarkets while low poverty areas lost less than half the amount of 
supermarkets as either category. This relatively low loss of supermarkets in low poverty zip 
codes meant in 1980 low poverty zip codes had more supermarkets than high poverty zip codes 
(though still fewer than middle poverty zip codes). Then, from 1980 to 1990, there was an 
increase in supermarkets in low poverty areas. This increase occurred while middle income zip 
codes lost a similar amount of supermarkets and high poverty areas lost twice as many 
supermarkets as low poverty zip codes had gained. The gain of supermarkets in low poverty zip 
codes and the loss of supermarkets elsewhere led to a significant negative relationship between 
supermarkets and poverty in 1990. 
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Discussion 
This study set out to investigate whether the mean household income, percent poverty 
and percent African American of a zip code necessarily leads to the number of supermarkets in a 
zip code or whether these associations are historically contingent. The analysis shows that a 
higher proportion of African Americans in a zip code is associated with fewer supermarkets from 
1970 to 1990. A more populous zip code is also associated with more supermarkets over time.  
The analysis shows that the relationship between mean household income and the number 
of supermarkets changed from 1970 to 1990. One consistent attribute about the relationship 
between the number of supermarkets and mean household income is that middle income areas 
had a relatively high amount of supermarkets over time. This high number of supermarkets in 
middle income areas led to a consistently non-significant relationship between supermarkets and 
mean household income. However, the location of supermarkets in high vs. low income zip 
codes changed over time. In 1970 low income zip codes had more supermarkets than high 
income zip codes. In 1980 and (to an even greater extent) 1990 low income zip codes had fewer 
supermarkets than high income zip codes. The analysis shows that the relationship between 
supermarkets and high vs. low income zip codes changed over time because high income zip 
codes in1970 lost significant fewer stores than other areas from 1970 to 1980 and low income zip 
codes in 1980 lost significantly more stores than other areas from 1980 to 1990 (both controlling 
for changes in demographics). 
Similarly, the analysis shows that the relationship between the percentage of people in 
poverty and the number of supermarkets changed from 1970 to 1990. In 1970 the relationship 
between the number of supermarkets and the percent of the population in poverty was positive. 
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This positive relationship between poverty and supermarkets became non-significant in 1980 and 
turned negative in 1990. Further analysis showed that, controlling for changes in demographics, 
the relationship between poverty and supermarkets changed direction over time due to a 
significantly smaller decline of supermarkets in low poverty areas compared to other areas from 
both 1970 to 1980 and 1980 to 1990. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis shows that the relationship between zip code economic characteristics and 
supermarket locations are historically contingent. These findings stand in contrast to previous 
research and theory that implies that in order to decipher or change the location of organizations 
one should investigate differences in demographics across neighborhoods either spatially or 
temporally. The ‘neighborhood effect’ of concentrated poverty on a lack of supermarkets is 
actually a ‘historical’ or an ‘extra-local’ effect of the time period in which the high poverty 
neighborhood exists. While poverty is itself problematic, access to supermarkets for those living 
in high poverty (or low income) areas in 1970 was not the problem it is today.  
To this point, policy interventions attempting to change neighborhood economic 
characteristics or modify the negative effects of economically disadvantaged areas on 
supermarket profit margins will only mask the historical shift of supermarkets away from 
economically disadvantaged areas to economically advantaged areas. Along these same lines, 
future research and theory should examine the problem of food deserts in economically 
disadvantaged areas as a historical issue; I do just this in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MARKET INSCRIBED LANDSCAPE: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF FOOD DESERTS 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter shows that the 'neighborhood effects' of a lack of resources provided by 
organizations to economically disadvantaged areas are moderated by institutional logics. This 
theory is demonstrated by examining the institutional logics of the grocery industry, a business 
whose scarcity in economically disadvantaged areas negatively affects resident outcomes. From 
the 1930s to early 1970s the grocery industry had a logic of ‘economies of scale’: growth 
through increasing sales volume. A new ‘mix margin merchandising’ logic came about after the 
mid 1970s: using low margins on high demand items (especially ‘staples’) to gain the foot traffic 
needed to increase sales of high margin items. Using company specific grocery store location 
data for the transitionary years of the industry (1970 to 1983), this chapter analyzes whether 
differences in company philosophy – economies of scale vs. mix margin merchandising – affect 
their presence in economically disadvantaged zip codes. Results show that supermarkets are less 
likely to locate in economically disadvantaged zip codes when operating under a mix margin 
philosophy. Combined with the results of chapter 2, these results indicate that a shift to a ‘mix 
margin merchandising’ institutional logic corresponded with a devaluation of (and exodus from) 
economically disadvantaged areas by the grocery industry after the mid 1970s.   
 
Chapter 3 showed that, at least for nine urban areas, the scarcity of supermarkets in 
economically disadvantage areas is historically contingent: in 1970 economically disadvantaged 
zip codes were not underserved by supermarkets; but from 1970 to 1990 supermarkets moved 
away from economically disadvantaged zip codes to an extent that cannot be accounted for by 
increased economic disadvantage.  
This chapter shows that the institutional logic of the grocery industry moderates the 
relationship between neighborhood economic attributes and the presence of supermarkets. It is 
hypothesized here that the changed relationship between neighborhood economic indicators and 
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supermarket location from 1970 to 1990 (shown in chapter 3) was caused by a change in the 
institutional logic of the grocery industry.  
To demonstrate this point, this chapter is organized into two sections: first, the chapter 
presents a historical analysis of the grocery industry. The historical analysis shows the grocery 
industry has had two dominant institutional logics since the 1930s: one existing from 1930 to the 
early 1970s, another existing from the mid 1970s through the present. These two institutional 
logics, reasons for the change in institutional logic in the 1970s, and the ways companies locate 
stores differently under these two logics are detailed below. Second, this chapter statistically 
investigates whether stores with corporate philosophies corresponding to the two different 
institutional logics had different store location patterns during the transitionary years of the 
grocery industry: 1970 to 1983; the relationship between store location and zip code economic 
disadvantage under different corporate philosophies (corresponding to different institutional 
logics) are of particular interest.  
 
Institutional Logics of the Grocery Industry 
The Economy of Scale Logic (1930s – 1960s) 
The years following WWI saw an increase in the profits of the U.S. retailing industry and 
a corresponding rise in retail chain stores (Lebhar, 1959). Efforts to combat the dominance of 
chain stores by independents ultimately proved to be ineffective (Mayo 1993) as the 1920s 
ushered in the era of the retail chain store (Calvani & Breidenbach, 1990). One industry heavily 
affected by chain stores was the grocery industry (Ingram & Rao, 2004: 451).  
57 
 
The increase in chain grocery stores in the 1920s and 1930s led to a new institutional 
logic of the grocery industry that would last until the early 1970s: A logic of economies of scale. 
Under the economy of scale logic, grocery stores operated on two related understandings of store 
operation: (1) Company growth and increasing profits were to be accomplished through 
increased sales volume and (2) raising prices to gain profit and below cost pricing to gain 
customers were illegitimate means of accruing profits. 
Academics (e.g. Adelman, 1959; Bloom, 1978; Mayo, 1993), industry insiders (e.g. 
Bellenger, Stanley &Allen, 1977: 60) and a congressional commission (U.S. National 
Commission on Food Marketing, 1966) have described the late 1930s through the 1960s grocery 
industry as one characterized by a focus on increasing sales volume to increase profits. For 
example, according to James Herring, chairman of the board and CEO of the Kroger Company in 
1977, “retailers always made their profits on sheer volume and the steady predictable growth of 
their markets. But beginning in the late 1960's, volume growth suddenly began leveling for the 
first time.” (Bellenger, Stanley &Allen, 1977: 60). From the late 1930s until the 1960s, grocery 
companies (both chains and independents) would grow by both increasing the sales volume per 
store as well as increasing the number of stores that they owned. As overall profits increased 
through sales volume, the company could lower price on their goods while maintaining or even 
increasing overall profits. Moreover, by lowering prices stores would seem even more attractive 
to consumers, further increasing sale volume and profits.  
During this economy of scale era, accruing profits by selling goods at high margins was 
generally viewed as an illegitimate practice (Adelman, 1957). Accruing profits by selling goods 
at artificially low margins (i.e. below cost selling) to gain customers was also viewed as an 
illegitimate practice during this era. As the president of the American Food Institute stated in 
1931 "Each (grocery) chain knows that its quotations will be met by the other chains. This has 
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turned men's minds towards other methods” (Lovell, 1948:9). The idea that a grocery store 
‘shouldn’t let their dollar become angry’ became axiomatic in the grocery industry (Progressive 
Grocer 1964: 140). Especially in the 1930s and 1940s, the practice of loss leader pricing –
lowering prices on well known items to gain the foot traffic to sell higher priced items – was 
particularly disdained by the grocery industry (Lovell, 1948:5-10; Tunks, 1938; U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission, 1932). 
The use of loss leaders and below cost selling was despised outside of the industry as 
well. Anti-chain store rhetoric concerning ‘keeping dollars local’, “monopoly, ‘financial 
feudalism’, loss of opportunity and (infringements on) democracy”, largely propagated and 
diffused by independent retailers, helped foster anti-chain store sentiments in 1920s and 1930s 
America (Ingram and Rao, 2004: 451). Two of the ‘deceptive’ practices that chains were claimed 
to use were predatory pricing (lowering prices to gain dominance in a market then raising prices 
afterwards to recoup losses) and loss leader pricing (Lovell, 1948:5-10). While, like most of the 
grocery industry, chain grocery stores viewed loss leader pricing as an illegitimate means of 
growth (Lovell, 1948: 9-10; Tunks, 1938; U.S. Federal Trade Commission. 1932), anti-loss 
leader and below cost selling sentiments were tied into anti-chain store legislation.  
Anti-chain store rhetoric in the late 1920s and 1930s  – though influenced heavily by 
retail trade associations such as the National Association of Retail Grocers (Ingram and Rao, 
2004)  – helped bring about state below cost pricing laws (some of which are still on the books 
today) and the short lived National Retail Assoication Codes (1933 – 1935) followed by the long 
lasting and more powerful Robinson-Patman Act (1936 – present). This legislation had a variety 
of effects on the grocery industry, including limits on, and formal illegitimacy of, the ‘deceptive’ 
practice of loss leader and below cost pricing strategies.  
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Sentiment against loss leaders by congress
28
 and courts lasted into the early 1970s. Anti-
loss leader sentiments were delivered by courts over time including statements about the 
deceptiveness to consumers and destructiveness to competition of the practice; examples include 
statements by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1959 (McIntyre & Volhard, 1972) and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1967 (who were speaking in reference to the virtues of state below 
cost laws). Similar sentiments were espoused by the National Commission on Food Marketing in 
1966 (U.S. National Commission on Food Marketing, 1966) and many in congress during a 
debate on the topic in 1972 (though not enough members to pass a federal bill against loss 
leaders) (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1972). 
The practices of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Company (A&P) stores in the 1930s speak 
to the interaction between law and industry disdain for high margin and below cost pricing 
practices. According to Adelman (1957: 40-55) the desired policy of A&P’s corporate 
management in the late 1920s and 1930s (and after) was to maintain the existing 'increasing 
volume leading to more efficiency and lower prices' business model. However, some individual 
A&P stores would use loss leaders and the status of A&P as a low price leader to gain customers 
and then, at the same time, increase the prices for other items as a way to increase the profits of 
the particular store. This was occurring despite the warnings (and to the annoyance) of A&P 
management that this method of selling for ‘embarrassingly high profits’ was unsustainable: the 
stores were making 'too much money' - which would lead to decreased sales, a strengthening of 
competition and a deterioration of the company overall (Adelman, 1957: 40-55). 
                                                          
28
 Through a variety of tactics (mostly using Section 2(b) of the Robinson Patman Act) the 
Federal Trade Commission focused on preventing price discrimination/ predatory pricing 
practices with businesses in commerce (i.e. not at the retail to consumer level) from the 1940s to 
the 1960s. (Calvani, 1979). 
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While the corporate management of A&P did what they could to eliminate these below 
cost/high margin practices, the short lived National Retail Association Codes followed by the 
Robinson-Patman Act also had an effect on limiting below cost and high margin selling. For 
example, while section 3 of the Robinson-Patman was hardly used (Calvani & Breidenbach, 
1990) and was weakened substantially in 1957 (McIntyre & Volhard, 1972), the use of below 
cost pricing was technically illegal under this law.
 
Even though A&P did not use any legal 
processes, the threat of potentially using legal avenues helped A&P’s corporate management end 
the use of loss leader (combined with high margin) selling by individual A&P stores (Adelman, 
1957: 51-55, 242).  
Outside of the barely used section 3, the Robinson-Patman act only applied to 
manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer relations and did not apply to direct to consumer sales (Bauer, 
1991; Crowley, 1947:332-333; McIntyre & Volhard, 1972). At least for direct to consumer 
pricing strategies, there were ways to get around these laws if grocery companies felt it to their 
advantage. Regardless, for a long while after the enactment of these laws loss leaders were 
generally not used by the grocery industry (Lovell, 1948:9-10). The interaction between industry 
and government disdain for high margin and below cost pricing practices spread, and upheld the 
strength of, an industry logic of growth through high volume sales from the late 1930s until the 
1960s.  
 
The End of Growth through Increased Sales Volume 
A variety of changes in 1970s U.S. society helped to make growth through high volume 
selling in the grocery industry untenable. Growth through high volume selling depends on the 
ability to enter new markets and expand sales. The decline of population growth in the U.S. in 
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the 1970s (Brock, 1981; Mayo, 1993; Walsh, 1993) meant that, by and large, new consumer 
markets would not emerge. Instead, increasing sales volume had to come from expanding within 
existing markets. Yet the expansion into existing markets would also prove difficult. The 
suburban market, a key area for increasing sales in the 1950s, had become saturated with grocery 
stores by the 1960s (Mayo, 1993: 191-193; Padberg and Rogers, 1987). Further, the use of 
mergers to increase sales volume became severely limited by federal law, and the Federal Trade 
Commission in particular, from the mid 1950s (and especially after the mid 1960s) until the mid-
1980s (Ellickson, 2011; Parker, 1976; Wrigley, 1992). 
Along with the decline in opportunities to expand into new markets, several other 
changes in U.S. society affected the ability of grocery companies to grow through increasing 
volume. For example, changes in the U.S. economy and law in the 1970s allowed for greater 
product differentiation. In the 1970s there was a change in manufacturing industries, from an 
economy of scale to an economy of scope method of accruing profit (Harvey, 1991) as well as 
the spread of information technology and computer networks in both manufacturing and retailing 
industries (Kahn & McAlister, 1997). These technological and organizational changes allowed 
for the manufacturing of a larger variety of products and the ability to elaborate differences in 
demand for varied products across a wide variety of grocery shoppers (e.g. Brock, 1980:26-27; 
Kahn & McAlister, 1997). Further, the 1970s ushered in the era of a much more lenient 
interpretation of price discrimination law (especially the Robinson-Patman act) by the Federal 
Trade Commission (Calvani, 1979; Schildkraut et al. 1991) and courts (Brodley & Hay, 1980; 
Gifford, 1994). While the Robinson-Patman act does not apply to direct to consumer pricing 
(Crowley, 1947:332-333; McIntyre & Volhard, 1972) changes in the interpretation of these laws, 
among other things, allowed manufacturers to charge (and retailers to negotiate) different prices 
for goods of ‘like grade and quality’.  
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Increases in energy costs and increasing wages for grocery employees also increased the 
overhead of grocery stores (Brock, 1980; Walsh, 1993) – and the overhead costs to sales volume 
ratio is crucial for an economy of scale logic. Further, changes in U.S. society affected time-
relevant behaviors of consumers (i.e. a desire for more ‘convenience’) including more women in 
the workforce (Walsh, 1993) a rise in disposable income (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1997) and 
the spread of microwave ovens (in the 1980s).  
As U.S. society changed in the 1970s so too did the viability of the grocery industry’s 
economy of scale logic. Profit generated by the grocery industry decreased markedly from the 
mid-1960s until the mid 1970s (Parker, 1976). For example, from 1964 to 1977 net profit as a 
percentage of sales dropped from around 1.4% to around 0.6% (Walsh, 1993:44). The 1970s saw 
a decline in population growth and ability to expand into more markets, as well as increasingly 
varied prices on increasingly differentiated products and higher store operating costs. These 
changes in U.S. society helped to make the ‘economy of scale’ institutional logic less profitable 
and untenable as the dominant method of grocery store operation. During the 1970s, the 
‘economy of scale’ logic of the grocery industry was replaced by a new institutional logic: a ‘mix 
margin merchandising’ logic. 
 
The Mix Margin Merchandising Logic (1970s – Present) 
While low prices have always been a concern in the grocery industry (e.g. Padberg, 
Knutson & Jafri, 1993), the loss of the ability to acquire sales volume by expanding into new 
markets led to increased competition over prices to lure in existing customers in the 1970s 
(Brock, 1981:19; Craswell & Fratrik, 1985: 6,47; Progressive Grocer, 1977a). Grocery stores 
wished to be seen as the ‘low price leader’ of the geographic market in order to keep existing 
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customers as well as convince customers of other stores to switch (Progressive Grocer 1972c, 
1981). With heightened competition over consumers through low pricing, grocery store ‘price 
wars’ escalated in a number of cities in the 1970s and 1980s (Craswell & Fratrik, 1985; McNair 
& May, 1976:54; Zimmerman, 1985). With a limited ability to (or prospects of) expanding into 
new markets, lowering prices by increasing sales volume was no longer tenable in the 1970s. A 
new logic of merchandising and pricing came about in the 1970s: what I call a mix margin 
merchandising institutional logic, though the concept of ‘one-stop shopping’ (e.g. A&P 1968 
SEC Public Filing; Jewel 1970 SEC Public Filing) is similar in definition. 
Being a ‘low price leader’ did (and does) not necessarily mean low prices for every item 
in the store. In order to be viewed as a ‘low price leader’, stores would only have to create low 
prices for items that had well known prices (Craswell & Fratrik, 1985; Kahn & McAlister. 
1997:98-104; Padberg, Knutson & Jafri, 1993; Zimmerman, 1985) – these items are known as 
key value items (van der Waal & Moss, 2011) or items with ‘high elasticity’ (Andreyeva, Long 
& Brownell, 2010). Items that promote the ‘low price leader’ image of a store are typically high 
demand items such as household ‘staples’ like milk, eggs, and some fruits and vegetables 
(Craswell & Fratrik, 1985: 28; Hobart, 1987; Holton, 1957; Padberg, Knutson & Jafri, 1993). 
Instead of lowering prices through increased sales volume, under a ‘mix margin merchandising’ 
logic prices on items with high elasticity are subsidized by the profits made from other items 
with low elasticity. Similarly, under this logic highly elastic items (e.g. staples) are sold at low 
margins in order to gain the foot traffic needed to sell a greater number of items with low 
elasticity but high margins.  
The ‘mix margin merchandising’ logic rests on three related understandings of 
supermarket operation: (1) Expanding and diversifying the product mix of stores, especially 
including both high margin and low margin items. (2) Company growth and increasing profits 
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are to be accomplished through increased sales of high-margin items. These high margin items 
include specialty items (sometimes from specialty departments) and ‘non-foods’. (3) 
Supermarkets develop a ‘low price leader’ image by having low prices on products whose prices 
are well known in order to keep and gain customers. The lure of customers through a ‘low price 
leader’ image increases the foot traffic needed to sell high-margin items. Profits made from high-
margin items (often of low demand) are typically used to subsidize the low prices of items whose 
price is well known (often of high demand). Briefly put, under the mix margin merchandising 
institutional logic supermarket companies gain profit and grow through the sale of high-margin 
items – and these high-margin sales rely on the foot traffic generated by low-margin items. 
The mix margin logic is perhaps best exemplified by the superstores and combination 
stores that arose in the early 1970s (Brock, 1981; Walsh,1993). These early 1970s superstores 
were defined as a “large self-service food market offering a broadened variety of food products, 
new departments of a customized nature and a major expansion in general merchandise” (‘non-
foods’) (Progressive Grocer 1973a; 1973b). Combination stores are similar but have around half 
of their space devoted to ‘non-foods’ (Progressive Grocer 1972a; 1972b). These store types, and 
similar stores under the ‘mix margin merchandising’ logic, are typically larger in size but size is 
not what defines them. In fact, store size (and sales per store) has been increasing since the 1920s 
(Daft, 1969; Mayo, 1993, Walsh, 1993:43). As Safeway put it in their 1976 Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) public filing “(Superstores) are larger than conventional 
supermarkets but the stocking plan, not the size, is the distinguishing characteristic” (p.11). 
As opposed to stores under an ‘economy of scale’ logic, the mix margin merchandising 
strategy of superstores and combinations stores is not necessarily about increasing sales volume. 
In fact, if the store had a high volume of sales for only their low margin items the store would 
fail. Further, post-1970s supermarket sizes “have gone well above the minimum scale required to 
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take advantage of possible scale economies” (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1997:12-13). As the 
profit derived from high demand items decreased  (i.e. ‘when food prices were squeezed’) new 
products (including specialty and ‘non-food’ items) became more important sources of profit. 
Instead of sale volume, the ‘mix margin merchandising’ logic focuses on pricing to gain 
customers (foot traffic) and optimizing the profit derived from entire shopping baskets of items 
with a mix of margins. As a consultant at the food market institute said in 1972: “we have to 
think more than about sales per ft. or inventory turns… We should be looking more at new profit 
per ft. and new return on dollar investment.” (Progressive Grocer 1972b: 63). Superstores and 
combination stores developed the original methods of strategically gaining profit through mixing 
margins on items to both gain foot traffic and sell high-margin items (Progressive Grocer 1972a; 
1972b; 1974b). This operating strategy was largely reserved for combination stores and 
superstores in the early 1970s; But through the late 1970s and by the 1980s the mix margin 
merchandising logic became the dominant logic of the grocery industry.  
The mix margin merchandising logic has two major, inter-related components: (1) high 
margin items with low elasticity and (2) low margin items with high elasticity. I will discuss 
these two components of the mix margin merchandising logic, and how their use increased 
during the 1970s and 1980s, in turn.  
 
High margin items with low elasticity 
As the era of growth through high volume sales became untenable, high margin items 
became an indispensible part of the grocery industry. Not only would these items provide a high 
percentage of the profit accrued by stores despite their low sales volume (Progressive Grocer 
1968; 1974a) high margin items allowed for stores to remain profitable even with low margin 
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pricing of high demand items (e.g. Progressive Grocer 1967d; 1972b). The increased concern 
over high margin items is reflected in the pages of grocery trade journals during the 1970s and 
1980s. For example, concerns over increasing store profits (profits per store – not sales per store) 
by selling high margin items (especially non-foods) became a huge concern in the monthly 
grocery trade journal Progressive Grocer during the mid 1970s to mid 1980s.
29
 Reflecting this 
increased number of articles on high margin items, an entire issue of progressive grocer (January, 
1978) was dedicated to describing the ways supermarkets can stock and sell high margin ‘non-
foods’. Similarly, while non-foods had been featured extensively in the journal in the years prior, 
an entire section (usually a few articles per issue) of Progressive Grocer dedicated solely to 
general merchandise began in 1984.  
Industry statistics provide an even more convincing picture of the concern over high 
margin items. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce (1963-1997), the percentage of 
sales within grocery stores that were groceries hovered around 85% from 1963 to 1977 (about 
15% ‘non-foods’). The percentage of sales within grocery stores that were groceries dropped to 
74.4% by 1987 (25% ‘non-foods’). This 25% ‘non-foods’ figure remained until at least 1997 (the 
most recent of this data the author can find). An increased concern over high margin items in the 
mid 1970s corresponded with a large increase in ‘non-food’ items sold by grocery stores.  
Further, product differentiation has increased exponentially in supermarkets since the mid 
1970s (up until at least 2005) (Ellickson, 2011). From 1974 to 1988 the number of items carried 
by U.S. supermarkets increased from 8,948 to 26,430 (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1997: 2). 
Especially since new items almost always have higher margins compared to existing items (e.g. 
                                                          
29
 This is based on my own reading of Progressive Grocer articles from the early 1960s to the 
1990s. 
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Progressive Grocer 1967a:53; 1967b; 1976c), by increasing the diversity of products (and 
including more non-food items), grocery stores were able to create a higher margin product mix.  
Perimeter departments also expanded after 1970. Items sold in perimeter departments 
have high margins (Progressive Grocer 1984a) with markups ranging from 35% to more than 
100% (Progressive Grocer 1976a; Walsh, 1993:51). From 1970 to 1990 there was a considerable 
increase in the percentage of stores offering delis (from 24% to 73%) bakeries (26% to 56%), 
seafood departments (0% to 33%) and floral departments (0% to 52%) (Walsh, 1993:11). The 
spread of perimeter departments to most supermarkets (not just superstores) since 1970 portrays 
the more general industry tactic of increasing the amount of merchandise with high margins. 
While low margin staples are typically promoted as the star attraction, these high margin items 
provide the true engine of growth for the modern supermarket.  
 
Low margin items with high elasticity  
Items that promote the ‘low price leader’ image of a store are typically high demand 
staples (Craswell & Fratrik, 1985: 28; Hobart 1987; Holton, 1957; Padberg, Knutson & Jafri, 
1993). For example, as one manager of retail development said in 1979, “Groceries will continue 
to be cost-oriented to generate business. With high margin service and non-foods departments, 
well-managed combination stores can meet warehouse and limited assortment stores on price”. 
(Progessive Grocer, 1979a: 48). Milk is and has been used as a loss leader since the 1950s 
(McIntyre & Volhard, 1972; Mayer, 1965).  Other groceries such as baby food, baking goods, 
condiments and noodles are and were also sold at low levels of margin to gain customers 
(Progressive Grocer 1975a,b). As competition grew, more and more groceries (especially those 
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with high elasticity) were priced at low levels of margin in order to increase the stores’ image as 
a ‘low price leader’ to gain consumers. (Progressive Grocer 1976b, 1978, 1979b, 1980). 
Under the mix margin merchandising logic, the sales of high margin items are key for 
growth. One consequence is that many groceries whose sales volume was viewed as paramount 
for growth under an economy of scale logic are now viewed as tools to attract customers that will 
buy high-margin items. The sale of fruits and vegetables are one group of items that were 
important for store profits under an economy of scale logic but comparatively less important for 
store profits under a mix margin merchandising logic. For instance, the relative percentage of 
profit gained from fruits and vegetables declined. As the sale of non-produce items increased in 
supermarkets, even if the sales and margins of produce remained similar over time, the profit 
made from produce relative to the profit made from all other items in the store as a whole would 
decline. Sales of fruits as a percentage of the overall sales of grocery stores went from 1.53% in 
1961 to 0.55% in 1986 while vegetables went from 2.65% in 1961 to 1.22% in 1986 (Messinger 
and Narasimhan, 1997: 15).
30
  
Further, the sale of fruits and vegetables are more likely to be judged in terms of the sales 
of higher-margin items. For example, in 1967 Progressive Grocer (1967c) reported the findings 
of a survey of 114 produce merchandising executives representing 5935 stores. These findings 
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 Statistics on margins for staple items are hard to compare over time. For example, even when 
estimating this group of items as similar across time, margins on fruits and vegetables only 
increased slightly – around 2%-3% from 1961 to 1986 (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1997: 15). 
However, these categories do not take into account the increased (margin producing) marketing 
of fruits and vegetables that has occurred since the 1970s. For example, ‘organic’ and other 
margin-producing labels, packaged items, chopped items, combination items (e.g. salads, 
platters) and incorporating them into deli and specialty departments all increased the margins of 
specific fruits and vegetables in ways that did not exist under an economy of scale logic. I could 
not find statistics for the margins of non-marketed fruits and vegetables over time, though I 
would hypothesize they declined. Regardless, stores are less reliant on profits from produce 
because of the greater amount of profit made from other items – and some of these other items 
include produce that has been modified and marketed to increase its margin. 
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did not even discuss the possibility of using produce as a loss leader; in the late 1960s produce 
merchandising executives were much more interested in how to best accrue profits from the sales 
of produce. Conversely, a 2000 survey of the operating practices of supermarket buyers (by the 
Food IndustryManagement Program at Cornell University) found that matching prices by 
competitors and loss leadering produce were important techniques for supermarkets. 
(McLaughlin, 2004:S84; see also e.g. Richards, 2006). As non-foods and specialty items became 
paramount for profit margins, fruit and vegetables were more often used as loss leaders. 
 
Store Location Patterns Under Each Institutional Logic 
The mix margin merchandising logic is also characterized by a decentralized 
management structure (Walsh, 1993) and an emphasis on acquiring information about consumers 
(by individual characteristics and geographic location) (Kahn & McAlister. 1997). These 
strategies stem from the more general approach of using low margin items to gain the foot traffic 
needed to sell high margin items. In terms of this study, the most important difference between 
the mix margin merchandising logic and the economy of scale logic is the location pattern of 
stores. 
Under a mix margin merchandising institutional logic companies will tend to avoid low 
income areas. Under this logic a large amount of profit is derived from high margin, low demand 
items – items low income consumers tend not to buy. For example, personal care products and 
services and housekeeping supplies were two categories of items that increased considerably in 
supermarkets from 1977 to 1987. In 1990 consumers in the highest quintile of income (the top 
20%) spent 3.6 times more on personal care products and services and 3.3 more on housekeeping 
supplies than consumers in the lowest quintile of income (BLS, 1993). While these statistics are 
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not specific to income spent in grocery stores, they do indicate that high income consumers will 
spend more money on these categories of items. 
Stores that rely on low income consumers will fare better under an economy of scale 
institutional logic. While people will be willing to spend more money on groceries depending on 
their income, diet or the overall economic climate – unlike non-foods and specialty items – 
groceries will be purchased by all demographics over time. To this point, while there are still 
discrepancies between incomes in their purchase of food at home, these discrepancies will be 
smaller than with other (‘non-staple’) items. For instance, in 1990 consumers in the highest 
quintile of income spent 2.2 times more on their ‘total food at home’, as well as 2.2 times more 
on fruits and vegetables specifically, than consumers in the lowest quintile of income (BLS, 
1993).
31
 Compared to a mix margin institutional logic, when grocery companies grow through 
increasing sales volume on groceries – as they do under an economy of scale institutional logic – 
store profitability and location patterns will be less likely to depend on income level.  
When comparing the two institutional logics’ relationship to low income consumers, both 
can be said to have their worth. Under the mix margin institutional logic, stores gain a large 
amount of profit from high margin items. In one respect, since low income consumers are less 
likely to purchase these items, there will be fewer stores in low income areas. In another respect, 
profits derived from high margin items help subsidize the low prices of high demand staples. In 
fact, low income consumers that live in middle or high income areas will benefit from the mix 
margin merchandising logic with lower prices on staples (Holton, 1957). Conversely, under an 
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 The ratio of the highest vs. the lowest quintile of income buying fruits and vegetables (2.11 in 
1972) and food at home (2.74 in 1972) was slightly higher in the early 1970s (BLS, 1978). In 
2012 this highest-to-lowest quintile ratio of was even higher for food at home (2.47), fruit and 
vegetables (2.63) and personal care product (4.68) (BLS, 2014). When we compare people with 
incomes over $35,000 to incomes under $5,000 (in 1974 dollars) the ratio for ‘food at home’ was 
still about 3 in 1974, compared to a ratio of about 5 for personal care products that were 
purchased in grocery stores (Burgoyne, 1980). 
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economy of scale logic, the profits of high margin items will not subsidize the prices of staples; 
however, since profits are derived from high grocery sales volume, low income areas will have 
more stores under an economy of scale logic.  
Considering the locational tendencies of each logic, this shift in institutional logic of the 
grocery industry explains the findings of chapter 3: that, controlling for changes in 
demographics, supermarkets moved away from low income urban areas and towards high 
income urban areas from 1970 to 1990. That is, as the logic of profitability through high margin 
items replaced the logic of profitability through high volume selling during the 1970s and 1980s, 
stores gradually moved away from low income areas towards high income areas.  
I further explore the effect of the shifting institutional logic of the grocery industry on the 
location of stores in economically disadvantaged areas from 1970 to 1990. Chapter 3 looked at 
changes in the location patterns of all supermarkets (in nine urban areas) from 1970 to 1990. 
This chapter investigates the store location patterns of specific companies and whether store 
location depends on their historically specific corporate philosophy. I focus the analysis on the 
transitionary years of the grocery industry: 1970 to 1983. Specifically, I hypothesize that, during 
these transitionary years of the industry, companies with a mix margin merchandising corporate 
philosophy were less likely to locate in economically disadvantaged areas as compared to 
companies with an economy of scale corporate philosophy.  
 
Data and Methods 
Company specific grocery store location data come from City Directories for the years 
1970, 1973, 1977, 1980 and 1983. City Directories are to be preferred over yellow pages. City 
directories are funded through subscription, meaning information about businesses are collected 
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by a canvass of businesses and “is compiled in a way to insure maximum accuracy”. Yellow 
page listings are paid for by the businesses who wish to be included in the classified sections. 
(Arrowhead Public Library System, 2003) This means those working at the yellow pages do not 
actively seek out businesses to make their information as complete as possible. One draw-back 
of city directories is that they do not include surrounding suburbs; thus the analysis only applies 
to urban areas. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the five digit zip code, which is to be preferred over 
census tracts for economic activity (Bingham and Zhongcai 2001; Small and McDermott 2006). 
While zip code boundaries are relatively stable (Adams 2007a) they may change over time 
(Krieger et al. 2002). Potential shifts in zip code boundaries are dealt with by looking for and 
excluding zip codes with dramatic changes in demographics from 1970 to 1980. Zip codes with a 
very small total population (under 500) are also excluded since large changes in socio-economic 
characteristics may stem from very minor actual changes in demographics.
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Nine urban areas were sampled with a total of 196 zip codes per year (for a total of 980 
zip codes in the five sampled years). The sample includes the following nine urban areas (with 
the number of zip codes in parenthesis): Buffalo, NY (19), Dallas, TX (33), Indianapolis, IN 
(18), Kansas City, MO (32), Memphis, TN (16), Milwaukee, WI (24), Nashville, TN (13), San 
Francisco, CA (22) and Seattle, WA (19). Following previous research on the importance of 
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 Originally there were 209 zip codes for these 9 cities. For a variety of reasons, 13 zip codes 
were eliminated from the data: Two zip codes (14218 and 64145) were eliminated given that 
they were not in city directories for every year analyzed. Seven zip codes (37213, 38118, 53208, 
75207, 75247, 94105 and 98134) were eliminated due to having a total population of less than 
500 (lows of populations of excluded zip codes were between 10 and 375). Two zip codes 
(98112 and 98117) were eliminated due to missing information in the 1970 census. Two zip 
codes were eliminated from the analysis due to dramatic differences between 1970 and 1980, 
suggesting changes in zip code boundaries: Zip code 75232 had a dramatic change (much more 
than any other zip code) in %Black and HH income from 1970 to 1980. Zip code 98107 had a 
dramatic decrease in population (34k, the next closest in 23k) from 1970 to 1980. 
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region (e.g. Wilson, 1996) about half of the cities come from the Northeast and Midwest (5) 
compared to the South and West. Also, following Massey and Denton’s (1993) influential book 
American Apartheid, about half of the cities (5) had black-white ‘hyper-segregation’. 
The grocery section of the city directories also includes convenience stores. The Super 
Market News 1970 and 1983 Distribution Study of Supermarket Sales are used to identify the 
supermarkets in these city directories (Supermarket News 1970; 1983). In these Super Market 
News Distribution Studies information about supermarkets are defined and reported by 
newspapers in these markets. Methods of compiling estimates vary, from detailed surveys to 
knowledge about the market based on checks among food representatives, brokers or stores, or 
informed opinion (Supermarket News 1970). Section 1 of the Distribution Study of Supermarket 
Sales shows the leading supermarkets for the top 50 Standard Metropolitan Areas broken down 
by the following categories: Leading chains, leading convenience stores chains, leading 
independents and voluntary or cooperative groups; convenience stores are also noted with a ‘C’ 
when appropriate. Only the non-convenience stores listed in either the 1970 or 1983 Distribution 
Study of Supermarket Sales were counted.  
According to the Supermarket News Distribution Studies (1970; 1983), 57 (‘leading’) 
grocery companies operated stores in the nine cities analyzed. To determine the corporate 
philosophy of these companies from 1970 to 1983 (and whether their philosophy changed during 
this time), information on these companies was searched for in the following sources: (1) 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Public Filings (found on Proquest Historical Annual 
Reports), (2) the grocery trade journals 'Supermarket News' and ‘Progressive Grocer', found 
online since 1983 (on Gale Cengage Academic), (3) hard copies of 'Progressive Grocer' from 
1967 to 1983. These sources provided information about the corporate philosophy for 24 of the 
57 companies. This method of coding is biased in favor of large chain stores as compared to 
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independents since the SEC public filings would not cover independents and Progressive Grocer 
and Supermarket News are biased towards reporting on large companies. However, the action of 
large companies are more substantial when analyzing industry trends since large chains are more 
likely to create, make legitimate and influence others to copy new industry trends (e.g. Fligstein 
1990; Haveman, 1993).  
Companies were coded as having a ‘mix margin merchandise’ format if they either (1) 
had made a declaration to focus on incorporating a greater amount of non-foods and a greater 
variety of products or (2) began to focus on operating 'superstores' or ‘combination stores’. For 
example, in their 1968 S.E.C. public filing A&P said “stores of the future will be larger, with 
many new departments and wider variety to enable the shopper to truly enjoy one stop 
shopping”. Also, a Progressive Grocer (1984c) article detailing Stop & Shop explained that their 
“movement to build only superstores and to expand some existing units into superstores began in 
1982, picked up steam during 1983, and continued at a hectic pace through the first three 
quarters of (1984)”. A&P and Stop and shop were coded as having a mix margin merchandising 
philosophy after (and an economy of scale philosophy before) 1968 and 1982 respectively.  
Companies were coded as having an ‘economy of scale’ format if they (1) did not say 
they were changing to a one-stop shopping model and either (2a) said they had not changed their 
store operations since the 1960s or before or (2b) if they said their company’s growth stemmed 
from increasing profits through increased sales volume (this includes converting to a warehouse 
store format focused on increased sales volume of low priced groceries). For example, a 
Progressive Grocer (1984b) article showed that “just a decade ago, Kohl's virtually owned 
Milwaukee. But…a misguided attempt to reposition the chain as discount-oriented led to a 
severe erosion of sales”. Also, a Progressive Grocer (1984d) article reported that Minyard had 
not started creating superstores until 1984. Kohl’s and Minyard are both coded as having an 
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economy of scale philosophy for the entire time period under analysis (before 1984). The list of 
24 companies, when their corporate philosophy changed to a mix margin merchandise 
philosophy (or if they maintained an economy of scale philosophy) and citations of evidence of 
their company philosophy can be found in the appendix.  
Based on the distinction between the two corporate philosophies, two different data sets 
were created. Both data sets contain all zip codes from 1970, 1973, 1977, 1980 and 1983; 
however, each data set only counts the stores of companies operating at the time under either an 
‘economy of scale’ or ‘mix margin merchandising’ philosophy, respectively. For company 
philosophy changes to ‘mix margin merchandising’ that occur on a year specifically in the data 
set (e.g. 1977), the stores in that year are counted as operating as under an 'economy of scale' 
philosophy. For example, since Marsh changed to a ‘mix margin merchandising’ philosophy in 
1977, Marsh stores are counted in the ‘economy of scale’ data set for the years 1970, 1973 and 
1977; Marsh stores in 1980 and 1983 are then counted in the ‘mix margin merchandising’ data 
set. Conversely, since Safeway changed to ‘one-stop shopping’ in 1976, Safeway stores in 1977 
(along with 1980 and 1983) are counted in the ‘mix margin merchandising’ data set; Safeway 
stores in 1970 and 1973 are then counted in the ‘economy of scale’ data set. This method led to 
two data sets: the number of stores in a zip code in 1970, 1973, 1977, 1980 and 1983 operating 
under either an (1) ‘Economy of scale’ or a (2) ‘mix margin merchandising’ philosophy.  
Data on the demographics of zip codes come from the Census of Population and 
Housing, 1970 and 1980 extract files (Adams 2007a; 2007b). Following previous research (e.g. 
Quillian, 1999) a ‘nearest census year method’ is used, connecting intercensal years to the 
nearest decennial census. For example, the 1980 census provides demographics for the 1977, 
1980 and 1983 supermarket data. Summary statistics for each variable are provided in Table 8. 
The logarithm of population is used “because some neighborhoods are primarily residential, 
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while others are primarily business zoned" (Small and McDermott 2006). To adjust for inflation, 
1970 mean household income is adjusted for 1980 dollars. In accordance with the census, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index is used to adjust for changes in consumer 
buying power over time (U.S. Census 2012). The percent of people in poverty is used as a 
separate economic measure. Along with a standard percentage, a dummy variable ‘%poverty 
over 30%’ is used to investigate the effect of living in a zip code with concentrated poverty 
(Ludwig 1999; Wilson 1996). The percent of the population in the zip code that is African 
American is also examined. 
Regression models are estimated with negative binomial regression. Negative binomial 
regression is used because the dependent variable, the amount of supermarkets in a zip code, is a 
count where the distribution of supermarkets is positively skewed (due to the larger amount of 
zip codes with a low amount of stores and a finite limit of zero) and the conditional variance 
exceeds the conditional mean. Two separate negative binomial general linear models are 
conducted for stores operating under each corporate philosophy. Conducting separate models for 
each corporate philosophy implicitly tests for interaction effects of the corporate philosophy on 
the relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables (e.g. Brown et al., 
2001). Finally, percent poverty, zip codes with poverty over 30% and household income are used 
in separate models since looking at one while controlling for the other makes little sense 
analytically. Taken together, these models elaborate the effect of corporate philosophy (economy 
of scale vs. mix margin) on the relationship between the number of grocery stores and the 
economic characteristics of a zip code from 1970 to 1983, controlling for population and %black. 
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Results 
Table 9 summarizes the models used to compare the store location patterns of companies 
with an ‘economy of scale’ philosophy (left columns) to companies with a ‘mix margin’ 
philosophies (right columns) during the years 1970 to 1983. As shown in table 9, logged 
population is a significant positive predictor of the number of supermarkets in a zip code for both 
company philosophies. Logged population is a more influential predictor of supermarkets under 
the ‘economy of scale’ philosophy, leading to slightly over two-thirds more stores per logged 
population than under a mix margin philosophy (179% vs. 96.6% increase in stores per logged 
population). Similarly, whether controlling for household income or poverty, the percentage of 
the zip codes’ population that is African American is a negative predictor of supermarket 
placement for both company philosophies. The percentage of African Americans is similarly 
influential for both philosophies; for example, controlling for poverty, for every 10% increase in 
the percentage of African Americans there is a decrease in stores by a factor of 0.927 (e
-0.076
) and 
0.951 (e
-0.050
) for an ‘economy of scale’ and ‘mix margin’ logic, respectively.  
The percentage of people in poverty and the categorical variable of zip codes with over 
30% poverty are not statistically significant predictors of the number of store in a zip code for 
either corporate philosophy. However, while not statistically significant, the poverty coefficients 
for the two philosophies tend towards opposite directions. For stores with an ‘economy of scale’ 
philosophy, while not statistically significant, for every 10% increase in poverty there is a 9% 
increase in stores in the zip code. Zip codes with poverty over 30% also have 1.2% more stores 
than other zip codes. Conversely, for stores with a ‘mix margin’ philosophy, while not 
statistically significant, for every 10% increase in poverty the number of stores in the zip codes 
decreases by a factor of 0.902. Zip codes with poverty over 30% also have 5.4% fewer stores 
than other zip codes. Again, while not statistically significant, these results show that stores with 
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an economy of scale philosophy tend towards poverty while stores with a mix margin philosophy 
tend to be repelled by poverty. 
Mean household income (in 1980 dollars) is a positive and statistically significant 
predictor of the number of stores in a zip code for both corporate philosophies (though this 
significance is at the 0.1 level for the economy of scale logic). For every $10,000 increase in 
mean household income (in 1980 dollars) there is a 3.4% and a 4.4% increase in stores for an 
‘economy of scale’ and ‘mix margin’ logic, respectively. Table 9 suggests that, unlike with 
poverty, household income is similarly predicted for stores operating under either corporate 
philosophy. 
Table 10 helps explain why stores under the two philosophies tend towards different 
directions in terms of poverty but tend toward the same direction for mean household income. 
Table 10 separates %poverty and household income into the bottom, middle two and top 
quartiles to show how the number of supermarkets in low, middle and high income/poverty 
categories differ for the two company philosophies. The top section of table 10 shows the total 
number of supermarkets for each demographic category analyzed. The bottom section of table 10 
shows the number of supermarkets divided by the logarithm of population (to control for 
population) for each demographic category analyzed.  
Looking at the number of stores per categories of mean household income, table 10 
shows that middle income zip codes have about as many stores as high income zip codes under 
an ‘economy of scale’ logic and more stores than high income zip codes for a ‘mix margin’ 
logic. Table 10 also shows that, under an ‘economy of scale’ logic, there is a positive 
relationship between the number of stores per zip code and household income; but this 
relationship is slight (as suggested by the small effect size shown in table 9). There is only a 23% 
increase going from low income to middle income zip codes and there is virtually no difference 
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between middle and high income zip codes. Conversely, under a ‘mix margin’ logic, table 10 
shows that there is a positive but non-linear relationship between household income and stores 
per zip code (with the most stores operating in middle income areas).  
Importantly, the relevance of mean household income is much greater for stores 
operating under a mix margin logic. Unlike with stores operating under an ‘economy of scale’ 
logic, there are large differences between categories of household income for stores operating 
under a ‘mix margin’ logic. Table 10 shows that middle income zip codes are favored under the 
mix margin logic. Even more though, low income zip codes are heavily disfavored under the mix 
margin logic. For an economy of scale logic, compared to low income zip codes there are 23% 
and 25% more stores in middle income and high income zip codes, respectively. For a mix 
margin logic, compared to low income zip codes there are 188% and 122% more stores in 
middle income and high income zip codes, respectively. Put another way, the disparity between 
stores in low income zip codes and high income zip codes is almost 5 times greater under the 
mix margin philosophy than the economy of scale philosophy. Further, the disparity between 
stores in low income zip codes and middle income zip codes is over 8 times greater under the 
mix margin philosophy than the economy of scale philosophy. These results indicate that 
supermarkets are more likely to avoid low income zip codes when operating under a mix margin 
logic compared to an economy of scale logic. 
Table 10 also helps to elaborate the relationship between poverty and store placement 
under the two philosophies. First, under both philosophies, most stores are located in middle 
poverty areas. This helps explain the lack of statistical significance. Second, table 9 shows that, 
while not significant, economy of scale stores tend towards poverty. Table 10 shows that 
differences in stores between categories of poverty are small under an economy of scale logic. 
While high poverty areas have the lowest amount of stores, there are only 23% and 39% more 
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stores in low and middle poverty zip codes, respectively. This suggests that stores operating 
under an economy of scale logic will tend toward middle poverty zip codes and will not avoid 
low poverty zip codes enough to make the overall poverty-store relationship negative.  
Finally, table 9 shows that, while not significant, mix margin stores tend to avoid poverty. 
Table 10 shows that, due to a much smaller amount of stores in high poverty zip codes, 
differences in stores between categories of poverty are large under a mix margin logic. 
Compared to high poverty zip codes there are 71% and 121% more stores in low and middle 
poverty zip codes, respectively. Put another way, the disparity between stores in high poverty zip 
codes and both low poverty and middle poverty zip codes is over 3 times greater under the mix 
margin philosophy than the economy of scale philosophy. These results indicate that 
supermarkets are more likely to avoid high poverty zip codes when operating under a mix 
margin logic compared to an economy of scale logic.  
 
Discussion 
This chapter argues that the institutional environment of organizations provides the 
context in which these organizations perceive, evaluate and act upon neighborhoods. Using the 
concept of institutional logics, the chapter set out to demonstrate how historically contingent 
institutional logics of the grocery industry moderate the presence of supermarkets in 
economically disadvantaged areas. A historical analysis of the grocery industry shows a change 
in the institutional logic of the grocery industry in the mid 1970s. From the 1930s to 1960s the 
institutional logic of the grocery industry was an ‘economy of scale’ logic: grocery companies 
would attempt to grow by increasing their sales volume on all items in their store(s). Changes in 
U.S. society in the 1970s help bring in a new institutional logic after the mid 1970s: a ‘mix 
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margin merchandising’ logic. Under this mix margin logic, stores would attempt to grow by 
having low prices on high demand items (especially food ‘staples’) to gain the foot traffic needed 
to increase sales of high margin specialty and non-foods items. 
These two institutional logics value low income neighborhoods differently. An economy 
of scale logic focuses on growth through increased sales of groceries, and since all income levels 
purchase groceries, this logic is more likely to value consumers of all incomes. Conversely, a 
mix margin merchandising logic focuses on low margins on groceries and growth through the 
sale high margin specialty and non-food items; since low income consumers are far less likely to 
purchase these high margin items compared to consumers of higher income levels, this logic 
does not value low income consumers. This change explains the results of chapter 3: that in 1970 
economically disadvantaged zip codes were not underserved by supermarkets; but from 1970 to 
1990 supermarkets moved away from economically disadvantaged zip codes to an extent that 
cannot be accounted for by increased economic disadvantage. 
Using company specific grocery store location data for the transitionary years of the 
industry (1970 to 1983), this chapter further analyzed whether changes in the institutional logic 
of the grocery industry changed the presence of supermarkets in economically disadvantaged zip 
codes. It was hypothesized that companies with a mix margin merchandising corporate 
philosophy were less likely to locate in economically disadvantaged areas as compared to 
companies with an economy of scale corporate philosophy. The results support this hypothesis. 
Results show that the disparity between stores in low income zip codes and high income zip 
codes is almost 5 times greater and the disparity between low income and middle income zip 
codes is over 8 times great under the mix margin philosophy than the economy of scale 
philosophy. Using poverty as a measure of economic disadvantage instead of income leads to 
similar results. The disparity between stores in high poverty zip codes and both low poverty and 
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middle poverty zip codes is over 3 times greater under the mix margin philosophy than the 
economy of scale philosophy. These results indicate that supermarket were more likely to avoid 
economically disadvantaged zip codes when operating under a mix margin philosophy compared 
to an economy of scale philosophy from 1970 to 1983. This indicates that a shift to a ‘mix 
margin merchandising’ logic for the industry as a whole after the mid 1970s corresponded with a 
devaluation of economically disadvantaged areas by the grocery industry.   
 
Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that it only looked at nine cities. The sample of cities both 
did and did not have hyper-segregation (according to Massey and Denton, 1993) and was in both 
the south and west and the Midwest and north (theoretically important according to Wilson, 
1996). However, nine cities are not enough to truly control for any city level variables. 
Considering the importance of city variables on retail location patterns (Small and McDermott, 
2006) future research should investigate city effects and especially their interaction with the 
historical change in institutional logic found in this study.  
Also, this study presented likely reasons why there was a change in institutional logic of 
the grocery industry; however, in large part, these are merely logical hypotheses since a 
systematic analysis of causation was not conducted. Future research could conduct such a 
systematic analysis. Changes in the interpretation of price discrimination by the Federal Trade 
Commission (Calvani, 1979; Schildkraut et al. 1991) and courts (Brodley & Hay, 1980; Gifford, 
1994) is a particularly interesting possibility. While price discrimination does not apply to direct 
to consumer prices, these changes likely affected the relationship between manufacturers and 
retailers – especially the ability to determine prices and profits (also see Wrigley, 1992). 
83 
 
Finally, this study only examines the era between 1970 and 1990. Other factors have 
likely affected the industry since 1990. For example, from 1972 to 1992 concentration levels of 
the grocery industry (measured as the percent of sales by the 4, 8, 20 or 50 largest firms) 
remained stable. However, from 1992 to 1996 concentration levels increased considerably in the 
grocery industry (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963-1997). Advances in data gathering and 
analyses about consumers, changes in the U.S. welfare system in the 1990s or the recession after 
2008 may have also had effects on the grocery industry. Regardless, U.S. trends after 1990 do 
not suggest that the mix margin merchandising logic is outdated (e.g. store location patterns vis-
à-vis economic disadvantaged areas, price elasticity and a low price image and specialty 
departments and non-food sales are all similar today).  
 
Conclusion 
Policies that promote or create mixed-income housing neighborhoods may attract 
supermarkets but, unfortunately, these policies can also promote gentrification (Hyra, 2013). 
Conversely, policies addressing the moderating effects of organizational dynamics on 
neighborhoods seem less likely to displace the residents of these neighborhoods. The results of 
this chapter indicate that policies addressing the institutional logic of the grocery industry may 
help produce more supermarkets in economically disadvantaged areas. In order to address the 
problem of food deserts
33
 policy makers must take into account that the profit made from 'staples' 
                                                          
33
 As stated, the mix margin logic may have beneficial outcomes for low income residents: If 
access is less of a factor for health compared to the price of staples (especially fruits and 
vegetables), the mix margin logic should be favored since it lowers the prices of staples. If access 
is more of a factor for health compared to price then future research, theory and policy should 
deal with the fact that high margin items subsidize the prices of staples (especially fruits and 
vegetables). While a comparative study has not been conducted, a great deal of research has 
shown that the presence or absence of supermarkets effects resident health outcomes. 
84 
 
has been artificially lowered (subsidized) by their use to pull foot traffic needed to sell more 
high-profit specialty items and ‘non-foods’.34 
At the federal level, there are very few practical policy solutions to the issue of high 
margin items subsidizing the prices of staples. Before any action at the federal level is to take 
place, debates about the problems of below cost pricing and price discrimination (and market 
regulation more generally) would need to be revisited. In the 1930s through 1960s the 
interpretation of price discrimination law by congress, the FTC and courts focused on protecting 
competitors to preserve long run competitive processes; after the mid 1970s this interpretation 
changed to protecting competition (letting the free market go on unimpeded) not protecting 
competitors (Calvani & Breidenbach, 1990; De Toro, 1983). This interpretation of price 
discrimination would need to change. 
The most likely legal avenues to reduce food deserts in economically disadvantaged areas 
are state below cost pricing laws (especially with minimum mark-up clauses). While future 
research is needed to demonstrate this point, these laws may provide a market for smaller 
grocery stores to compete with the sale of staples by supermarkets (who would be limited by law 
in subsidizing these prices with high margin items). Oller (2011) showed that state below cost 
laws (especially laws with minimum mark-up clauses) lead to more small grocery stores. Future 
research would do well to expand upon the relationship between below cost pricing laws and 
grocery store location patterns. Even more, an investigation of the moderating impact of below 
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 Grocery store decision makers may better fit into low income areas by taking this advice as 
well. Low margin staples are priced too low to be competitively sold without some type of 
subsidization. Further, raising prices on staples in low income areas is unlikely to garner the 
sales volume needed to sustain their placement in low income stores. One possibility is to find 
high-profit non-foods and specialty foods that low income individuals tend to buy may offset the 
costs associated with selling the low-profit staples. Further, if certain neighborhoods of low 
income consumers are willing to buy high-margin staples – such as specialty meats or organic 
fruits and vegetables –these low income areas would support grocery store types that focus on 
high-margin food sales over the sale of high-margin non-foods. 
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cost laws on the health outcomes of residents of areas without large supermarkets may be 
especially poignant. 
At its heart, this chapter argues that, following ‘new institutional’ theory (c.f. 
Greenwood, 2008), institutional environments are the context in which the demographic 
attributes of neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. 
Institutional logics (c.f. Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) provide an appealing avenue for 
investigating the ways institutional environments historically moderate the relationship between 
neighborhood demographics and the presence of neighborhood organizations. Using this theory, 
this chapter shows that the ‘neighborhood effects’ food deserts have on residents do not 
necessarily stem from living in an area with concentrated poverty – they stem from living in an 
area with concentrated poverty during the post-mid 1970s institutional logic of the grocery 
industry. The effect of historically contingent institutional logics of the grocery industry on the 
supposedly ‘market-driven’ location behaviors of grocery companies is focused on in this 
chapter; however, future research can examine the institutional environments of a wide variety of 
organizations that moderate a wide variety of neighborhood relationships. This line of research 
can extend theories of the ways in which institutional environments – by influencing the way 
organizations perceive, evaluate and act upon neighborhoods – affect the lives of neighborhood 
residents.  
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CHAPTER V 
MINORITY COMPETITION AS A PREDICTOR OF 
AFRICAN AMERICAN FOOD DESERTS 
 
Chapter Summary 
Extending Small and McDermott’s (2006) ‘conditional perspective’, Blalock’s (1967) minority 
competition theory is used to explain how the relationship between African Americans and the 
number of supermarkets in a zip code depends on the city in which it resides. 2010 American 
Community Survey and ZIP Business pattern data are examined with hierarchical general linear 
models to explore whether the previously observed negative relationship between the percentage 
of African Americans and the number of supermarkets in a zip code depends on the percentage 
of African Americans in the city. The results show that the relationship between the percentage 
of African American and the number of supermarkets depends on the percentage of African 
Americans in the city in the U-Shaped pattern predicted by minority competition theory. 
Applications of minority competition to other theories of the unequal distribution of resources in 
cities are discussed. 
 
According to chapter 3, at least for nine urban areas, the relationship between the 
percentage of African Americans and the presence of supermarkets in zip codes was consistently 
negative from 1970 to 1990. While I do not uncover historical variation, there may be between 
city variation in the relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence 
of supermarkets in zip codes. My historical data set of nine cities is too small to reliably decipher 
between city variation in this relationship. In lieu of historical data
35
, I use a 2010 data set of 366 
U.S. cities to examine whether the relationship between the percentage of African Americans 
and number of supermarkets in a zip code varies by city.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, agreeing with (a non-historical version of) Massey and Denton 
(1993), and contrary to Wilson (1987; 1996), this dissertation argues the percentage of African 
Americans in a neighborhood has an effect on the presence of organizations, independent of 
income. However, modifying Massey and Denton's thesis, I use minority competition theory to 
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 Future research (with a larger sample of cities) can use a similar method to examine by-city 
relationships (and possible interaction effects between industry and city variables) historically. 
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show that the relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of 
organizations in a neighborhood depends on the city in which it resides. It is my hypothesis that 
the relationship between the percentage of African Americans and number of supermarkets in a 
neighborhood is contingent upon city minority competition (Blalock, 1967) dynamics. 
 
Minority Competition Theory 
Perhaps know more widely as racial threat theory, Blalock (1967) proposed minority 
competition theory as a way to describe how macro level processes effect motivations to 
discriminate which, in turn, effects inequalities between races. The current study lacks measures 
of motivations to discriminate (though possibilities for future conceptualizations and 
measurements are presented in the conclusion); however, while measures of motivations to 
discriminate should be desired where available (e.g. Quillian, 1996; Stults and Baumer, 2007), 
Blalock (1967) argues that by studying how the percentage of minorities relates to unequal 
outcomes between groups we can infer how discrimination occurs (Also see for example 
Behrens, Uggen and Manza 2003; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Welch and Payne 2010). 
In essence, minority competition theory states that as a minority group becomes a greater 
threat to the resources of the majority group, this majority group will increasingly use 
discriminatory means to maintain resources. While there are other factors involved in the threat 
minorities pose to the majority, a higher percentage of minorities is largely understood as the 
primary way minorities will provoke a perceived threat in the majority. That is, as the percentage 
of minorities increase, this increase will provoke a greater motivation by the majority to hoard 
resources away from this minority group. However, since discrimination is cumulative, as the 
percentage of minorities grows the minority group will become less of a threat (due to their 
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greater handicap). For example, a 5% minority increase will create a greater degree of inequality 
going from 10-15% compared to 30-35% (Blalock 1967:147-150). Continuing with this idea, as 
others have noted (e.g. Horowitz 1985; Turk 1969), as the percentage of minorities becomes 
large, they will be able to gain some ability to attenuate the already high effects of 
discrimination. As such, minority competition theory predicts a non-linear relationship (a 
decreasing then slightly reversing slope) between the percentage of minorities and racial 
inequality. 
Research on minority competition has typically focused on the effect of the percentage of 
minorities on punishment practices (also called punishment power by Blalock). While not 
universally supported, minority competition theory
36
 has found that increases in the percentage 
of minorities relates to such phenomena as police use of deadly force (Chamlin 1989), the death 
penalty (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), interracial killings (Jacobs and Wood 1999), high school 
punitiveness (Welch and Payne 2010) and disenfranchisement (Behrens, Uggen and Manza 
2003). Despite this large body of research there are few studies on the impact of minority 
competition on the unequal distribution of resources across groups (also called reward power by 
Blalock). Although it was also theorized to predict unequal economic outcomes, minority 
competition research incorporating economic indicators tends to use them as causal variables of 
motivations to discriminate: also known as ‘economic threat’ (e.g. Bonacich 1972; Eitle, 
D'Alessio and Stolzenberg 2002; Olzak 1990; Parker, Stults, Rice 2005; Stults and Baumer 
2007). The minority competition theory elaborated by Blalock conflates economic indicators as 
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 There have been a few variations on Blalock’s (1967) early work on minority competition 
theory (Eitle, D'Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2002) as well as Blumer’s (1958) earlier theory that 
discrimination and prejudice are contingent upon group position (and feelings of privilege and 
threat that arise from group positioning). I focus on Blalock’s (1967) theory to avoid too much 
confusion between theories with slight variations. 
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both causes of motivations to discriminate and as outcomes of the competitive threat minorities 
pose that motivate discrimination. Though future theorizing should attempt to do so, this study 
does not elaborate how to separate economic indicators as causes and effects of motivations to 
discriminate. This chapter simply points out that the minority competition process can prove 
useful in understanding causes of the unequal distribution of resources across groups.  
This chapter suggests that minority competition processes effect racial inequalities in the 
resources organizations provide across neighborhoods. The focus here is on supermarkets due to 
the influence supermarket placement (or a lack thereof) has on communities and its residents. 
Research on supermarket placement has focused on neighborhood demographics as causal 
variables finding that, among other things, a higher percentage of African Americans will 
decrease the number of supermarkets in an area. However, it is hypothesized here that this 
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and number of supermarkets in a 
neighborhood is contingent upon city minority competition dynamics. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that the effect of the percentage of African Americans on the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code depends on the (non-linear) competitive threat of African Americans 
in the city in which the neighborhood resides: an increase in the percentage of African 
Americans in a city will increase the negative relationship between African Americans and 
supermarkets in the zip codes of a city, though this increasing effect will slow and even 
somewhat decline at higher levels. 
 
Data and Methods 
Summary statistics for the variables used in this study are presented in Table 11. The 
level 1 unit of analysis is the five digit zip code, which is to be preferred over smaller geographic 
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units such as census tracts for economic activity (Bingham & Zhongcai, 2001; Small & 
McDermott, 2006). Data for the dependent variable - the number of supermarkets in a zip code - 
come from the Census 2010 ZIP business patterns. The North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) code 445110 for ‘Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience) 
Stores’ is used in this study. Previous research has shown that supermarkets and other larger 
grocery stores (with 20 or more employees) tend to be placed in White areas while small grocery 
stores (with 19 or fewer employees) are more common in African American neighborhoods 
(Alwitt and Donley 1997; Moore and Diez Roux 2006; Morland et al. 2002; Sloane et al. 2003; 
Small and McDermott 2006). While the NAICS separates convenient stores from grocery stores 
and supermarkets, many of the stores in NAICS 445110 may be conceptually similar to 
convenience stores (i.e. they do not sell fresh fruits and vegetables). For example, Horowitz et al. 
(2004) found that only 18% of small grocery stores in a predominantly racial minority 
neighborhoods sold healthy foods. Further, a lack of larger grocery stores and supermarkets 
(compared to small groceries) has been associated with higher grocery prices (Chung and Myers 
1999). Given the suspect availability of fresh fruits and vegetables at average market prices in 
smaller grocery stores, this study only looks at grocery stores and supermarkets with over 20 
employees.
37
 
Data for the level 1 and level 2 independent variables come from the 2007-2011 
American Community Survey 5 year estimates. The level 1 variables are at the ZIP Code 
Tabulation Area (ZCTA) level (n=16690). While ZCTAs differ from zip codes they do not tend 
to differ dramatically, especially for economic indicators. According to Bajaj et al (2011), around 
97% of the number of establishments in 2000 zip codes matched the number of establishments in 
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 A measure of stores with over 50 employees was also used (c.f. Alwitt and Donley, 1997; 
Moore, Diez Roux. 2006) which led to similar results. 
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2000 ZCTAs. While not ideal, it is justifiable to use ZCTAs and Zip Codes interchangeably as is 
done in this analysis. The level 2 variables are at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level 
(n=366). The ZCTA level data (level 1) are ‘nested within’ the MSA level data. A ‘centroid’ 
approach is used with GIS technology to create a ‘ZCTAs within MSAs’ multi-level structure. 
The centroid approach creates a geographic center point for each ZCTA; ZCTAs with a center 
point within a MSA boundary are taken as nested within the MSA. As a result, zip codes partly 
within MSAs but with center points outside the MSAs are excluded from the analysis. Further, 
481 ZCTAs (<3%) had incomplete information and are removed from the analysis; all cases 
removed have less than 10 (and in most cases 0) population. 
The percentage of African Americans is the main level 1 variable of interest in this study. 
Central city location (a binary variable) and the percentage of people in poverty
38
 have also been 
associated with supermarket placement (Algert, Agrawal and Lewis 2006; Lee and Lim 2009; 
Morland et al. 2002; Powell et al. 2007; Zenk et al. 2005) and are included in this analysis. 
Population density is also included in the models analyzed. To construct the population density 
variable the log of the population is calculated (to account for the uneven distribution of 
population in primarily residential vs. primarily business zip codes) and then multiplied by the 
area of the ZCTA.  
This study largely follows the level 2 control variables used in the only other paper to 
investigate city effects on the neighborhood resources organizations provide (Small & 
McDermott 2006). The level 2 control variables include population density, percentage 
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 In other models (not shown) the mean household income of the zip code (and of the city as a 
whole) was used as a variable instead of percent poverty; these models led to similar results as 
those presented here. Mean household income and percent poverty are conceptually similar so 
controlling for one while analyzing the other makes little sense analytically (not to mention 
creating problems of multicolinearity). 
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unemployed and percentage of people in poverty. A categorical variable for region is also used 
with the following common categories: Northeast, Midwest, West and South (South is the 
reference category). The main level 2 variable of interest is the percentage of African Americans 
in the city. As is common in investigations of minority competition theory, quadratic terms are 
used with percentage African American to identify the non-linear (U-Shaped) relationship 
predicted by minority competition theory.  
The distribution of supermarkets is over-dispersed (where the conditional variance 
exceeds the conditional mean) and positively skewed due to the larger amount of zip codes with 
a low amount of stores and a finite limit of zero. As a result, all models are estimated as a 
Poisson distribution with over-dispersion (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Grand mean centering 
(and uncentered variables) will always complicate analyses when group means vary substantially 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Grand mean centering is especially problematic for cross-level 
interactions because grand mean centered level 1 variables contain both within and between 
group variation. Group mean centering removes all between‐city variation from the independent 
variables, leaving level 1 slope coefficients that only measure within-city variation. Accordingly, 
level 1 variables are group mean centered to allow for truly separate analyses of level 1 
relationships and the moderation of these relationships by level 2 variables (Enders & Tofighi 
2007; Hofmann and Gavin 1998; Raudenbush 1989). Also, all level 2 predictors are entered at 
both the random percent African American slope and the intercept to parse out their unique 
effects, which may be correlated otherwise (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002:151).  
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Results 
Table 12 presents logged odds from the Poisson model with only zip code (level 1) 
predictors of the number of supermarkets in a zip code. The significance of population density, 
percent of people in poverty and central city location on supermarket placement is consistent 
with previous research. The results show that a central city location is associated with a 273% 
increase (e 
1.316
) in supermarkets as compared to other areas. Further, for every 10% increase in 
the percent of people in poverty in a zip code, there is a 5% decrease (e 
-0.0048x10%
) in the number 
of supermarkets in the zip code. The main variable in this analysis – the percent of African 
Americans in a zip code – is also significantly related to the number of supermarkets. As shown 
in table 12, for every 10% increase in the percent of African Americans in a zip code, there is a 
2.5% decrease (e 
-0.025x10%
) in the number of supermarkets in the zip code.  
When the level 1 intercept and percent African American slope are made random 
(allowed to vary across cities) they are shown to have statistically significant variation (p < 
0.001) across cities.
39
 For hierarchical linear models using a Poisson distribution the level 1 
variance depends on the expected mean (Goldstein, Browne and Rasbash 2002; Small and 
McDermott 2006). Therefore, this analysis can only provide the within and between variances 
for a zip code with the average log number of supermarkets. Given these limitations, the 
proportion of variance explained by each level (the intra-class correlation) for a zip code with the 
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 The percent African American slope becomes positive when it is made random (without any 
predictors). This is because once the slope is made random the groups are no longer centered 
within cities as these slopes are subtracted from the between city (grand) mean. As such, this 
variation at the slope’s intercept takes into account both within and between city variations. This 
is a positive sign for eliminating racial disparities: the fact that the within city percent African 
American slope is negative while the random percent African American slope is positive means 
the negative %African American relationship can be predicted to become positive with city level 
variables. This chapter does not completely resolve the issue but provides important insights 
towards resolving racial disparities in the resources organizations provide. 
94 
 
average log number of supermarkets shows that about 11.2% of the variation in supermarkets 
occurs between cities compared to 88.8% variation within cities. The between city (level 2) 
variation in the percent African American slope is significant (p < 0.001) and explains 0.002% of 
the total variation in the number of supermarkets per zip code. While the effect of cities on the 
percent African American slope explains a small amount of the total variation in the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code, it is both statistically and theoretically significant – explaining how 
cities moderate the relationship between the percentage of African American and the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code.  
Table 13 presents the logged odds from the multilevel Poisson model predicting the 
number of supermarkets in a zip code. Both the level 1 intercept and the level 1 slope of 
percentage African American in a zip code are random with level 2 predictors. Looking at the 
predictors of the intercept, the unemployment rate, the percent in poverty and the region of a city 
significantly predict the number of supermarkets per zip code in a city. However, the percent in 
poverty and unemployment rate predict the number of supermarkets in opposite ways: a smaller 
percentage in poverty but a higher unemployment leads to more supermarkets per zip code in a 
city.
40
 The categorical region variable shows that there are more supermarkets per zip code in the 
West compared to any other region, followed by the South, Northeast and Midwest. Population 
density is not a significant predictor and the percentage of African Americans in the city only 
(positively and linearly) predicts the number of supermarkets per zip code in the city at the p < 
0.1 level.  
Table 13 also presents the level 2 predictors of the relationship between the number of 
supermarkets and percentage African Americans in a zip code. Looking at the predictors of the 
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 While this result is tangential to the purpose of this chapter, these results suggest further 
theoretical elaboration of the meaning and supposed effects of different economic indicators. 
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percent African American slope, the proportion of people in poverty significantly predicts the 
relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the number of supermarkets in a 
zip code: as the poverty rate of a city increases the African American slope becomes less 
negative. Population density, unemployment and region do not significant predict the percent 
African American slope.  
The primary focus of this study is whether and how the percentage of African Americans 
in the city moderates the relationship between the number of supermarkets and percentage 
African American in a zip code. Table 13 confirms the minority competition hypothesis. The 
level 1 percent African American slope is significantly and non-linearly moderated by the 
percentage of African Americans in the city. Figure 8 further elaborates the non-linear 
moderation of the percentage of African American in the city on the relationship between the 
percentage of African Americans and number of supermarkets in a zip code. Figure 8 graphs the 
slope of the percentage of African Americans on the number of supermarkets in a zip code across 
different levels of the percentage of African Americans in a city. At very low levels of the 
percent African American in the city, the negative slope is small. The negative slope is largest at 
medium levels of percent African American in the city. After 19% African American in the city 
(the inflection point), the negative slope begins to decrease slowly. Numerically, at 1% African 
American in the city, for every 10% increase in the percentage of African Americans in a zip 
code there are 4% fewer supermarkets. This relationship changes to 15.6%, 28.1% and 23.7% 
fewer supermarkets for cities with 5%, 20% and 35% African American respectively. 
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Discussion 
This chapter extends Small and McDermott's (2006) 'conditional perspective’ of 
neighborhood effects by investigating whether city minority competition (Blalock, 1967) 
moderates the negative effect of the percentage of African Americans on the number of 
supermarkets in a zip code. Consistent with previous research on supermarket placement 
patterns, the results show a negative relationship between the percentage of African Americans 
and number of supermarkets in a zip code. However, the variation between cities in this percent 
African American slope is statistically significant: the relationship between the percentage of 
African Americans and number of supermarkets in a zip code depends on the city in which the 
zip code resides.  
The minority competition theory predictor – the percentage of African Americans in a 
city and its quadratics – significantly predicts the between city variation in the African American 
slope. Reinterpreting the results in terms of minority competition theory, the results show that at 
low levels of African Americans in a city there is low perceived threat and low inequality in the 
placement of supermarkets. As the percentage of African Americans in the city increases, 
supermarkets are increasingly located away from African Americans; However, at high levels of 
African Americans in a city, the increasing unequal distribution of supermarkets away from 
African Americans declines - theoretically due to the cumulative effect of discrimination and the 
increased ability to attenuate discrimination when numbers are high. These results confirm that, 
at least for supermarkets, minority competition theory can prove useful in explaining how city 
dynamics moderate the location of organizations away from African Americans. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter primarily extends the conditional perspective of neighborhood effects 
elaborated by Small and McDermott (2006) to the effect of the percentage of African Americans 
on the number of supermarkets. The article is also a call to incorporate minority competition 
theory into studies of the location of beneficial organizations (and the resources they provide) 
away from African Americans. As noted, previous studies of minority competition tend to take 
the economic resources of minorities as a potential cause of perceived threat (known as 
economic threat). Extending minority competition theory is somewhat problematic due to its 
conflation of economic resources as both a cause and effect of the perceived threat of 
competition by the majority. Future theorizing and research should attempt to separate economic 
resources as cause or effect. Different measures of perceived economic threat and the actual 
distribution of resources may be helpful. Longitudinal studies will likely provide the best 
opportunity for examining whether increases/decreases in economic resources of a minority 
group precede or proceed perceived threats by the majority. 
Along the lines of investigating causes of perceived threat and inequality, Quillian (1996) 
argues that a true test of minority competition theory should incorporate the mediating effect of 
individual beliefs about threat (which then lead these individuals to take discriminatory action). 
This study lacks the discrimination/prejudice component of the minority competition model that 
future research will hopefully provide. Even more though, the actors involved in minority 
competition dynamics should be empirically elaborated. While studies of levels of individual 
prejudice and discrimination are certainly apt, the perceived threat of minorities by the majority 
may or may not reflect the attitudes of individual residents (Blumer 1958). The effect of minority 
competition may work more broadly – inducing a culture of minority threat in the city. For 
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example, a culture of minority threat may provoke a heightened sense of privilege for a largely 
majority area to accrue more resources than an area with more minorities (e.g. Blumer 1958), a 
heightened collectively understood stigma of minority dominant areas (e.g. Anderson 1992), a 
built environment that both distinguishes groups and portrays their threat (e.g. Caldeira 2001), or 
a more salient attitude that, since others are prejudice, home or store sales will suffer where 
minorities are more common (and should be avoided).  
Further, when investigating those who discriminatorily react to perceived threats of a 
minority group, urban regime theory (Stone 1989) and urban political economy (Logan and 
Molotch 1987) may provide an avenue for future research. Both urban regime and urban political 
economy theory look past the demand-based or pluralist view of the distribution of resources in a 
city. Instead, these theories focus on elite coalitions and ‘growth machines’ who attempt to 
construct and organize the city in ways that serve their particular interests. In large part, these 
theories ignore the independent effects of racial dynamics, viewing race as one component to 
consider in the pursuit of the economic interests of those who govern (Kraus 2004). As a group 
conflict theory in its own right, minority competition theory can be studied along with urban 
regime and urban political economy theories to investigate the unequal distribution of resources 
in cities. One possibility is that minority competition occurs on elites through the perceived 
distinctness of a minority group when their numbers are large (e.g. Blumer, 1958). For example, 
when the percentage of African Americans grows large, efforts attempting to foster growth may 
treat African Americans as a group distinct from – and threatening to – the mainstream ‘growth 
machine’ projects. Further, there may be an interaction between elites and a general culture of 
threat in a city – where elites work to exploit the perceived threat of the majority, sometimes for 
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the gain of elites, sometimes for the gain of the majority (e.g. see Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Roscigno 1996). 
Finally, as noted, supermarkets were chosen due to their noted influence on communities 
and its residents. While the correlates of supermarkets are discussed in this chapter (percentage 
African American), the ways a city can moderate the effect of living in an area with limited 
access to supermarkets are not investigated. Using a similar methodology, future research might 
look at possible city specific dynamics that moderate the impact of living in an area with limited 
access to supermarkets (or any other detrimental neighborhood characteristic). For example, 
community organizations and government efforts to help those with limited access to 
supermarkets may alleviate the stigma or negative health impacts living in an area without 
supermarkets might have. While efforts by cities to bring supermarkets to underserved areas are 
rare (Pothukuchi, 2005), alternative city specific initiatives (e.g. see Anderson, 2007; Karpyn, 
Young and Weiss, 2012) such as subsidies for fruits and vegetable sales in underserved areas or 
well-funded public transportation and food stamp programs may also prove a ‘conditional 
perspective’ of the effect of supermarkets on communities and its residents.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
The existing literature on ‘food deserts’ suggests that areas that lack supermarkets tend to 
have fewer available jobs (Strait 2001) less social cohesions (Blanchard et al. 2003; Eisenhauer 
2001; Oldenburg 1989) more expensive food (Chung and Myers 1997; Kaufman et al. 1997) and 
promote negative health outcomes for local residents (Franco et al. 2009; Laraia et al. 2004; 
Lopez 2007; Michimi and Wimberly 2010; Moore et al. 2008; Morland, Wing and Diez Roux 
2002; Morland and Kelly 2009; Powell et al. 2007). The food desert literature has also shown 
that supermarkets are much less common in urban areas with a higher percentage of those in 
poverty, a higher proportion of African Americans, and a populous with lower income. Despite 
the expansive literature on ‘food deserts’ and massive history of urban sociological research and 
theory, these two literatures have evaded each other. Instead of elaborating ‘food deserts’ as a 
more general (urban) problem of neighborhood resource disparities, the (largely public health) 
‘food desert’ literature has tended to take the correlates of supermarket location as their cause. 
This dissertation incorporates urban sociological theory into the study of food deserts in order to 
better understand the causes of the presence of supermarkets in neighborhoods (or lack thereof). 
This dissertation shows that the ‘neighborhood effect’ explanations of the lack of material 
and symbolic resources in low income and high percentage African American neighborhoods – 
specifically disparities in the presence of supermarkets –are insufficient.  Despite their 
differences, current policies attempting to attract resource to underserved areas (c.f. Hyra, 2013), 
research on food deserts (c.f. Beaulac, Kristjansson, & Cummins, 2009; Larson, Story, & 
Nelson, 2009; Lovasi et al., 2009) the ‘deinstitutionalized ghetto’ hypothesis (Wacquant 2008; 
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Wilson, 1996) and the hypothesis of the continuing significance of race (Massey and Denton, 
1993) all follow (in one way or another) the ‘neighborhood effect’ model of the location of 
organizations: particular demographics cause the location of organizations and these 
relationships between organization location and demographics remain stable over time. 
Following previous research on the effect of cities and organizations on neighborhood resources 
(e.g. Marwell, 2007; Small and McDermott, 2006; Small, 2009) this dissertation developed and 
empirically demonstrated two theories of how cities and industries moderate the presence of 
supermarkets in economically disadvantaged and African American zip codes. 
First, this dissertation showed how ‘new institutionalism’ (c.f. Greenwood, 2008; 
Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) can be used to investigate the causes of, and possible 
solutions to, the scarcity of organizations (and the resources they provide) in low income areas. It 
was argued that historically contingent institutional logics are the context in which 
neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. Statistical results from 
nine cities showed that in 1970 economically disadvantaged zip code were not under served by 
supermarkets. From 1970 to 1990 supermarkets exited economically disadvantaged zip codes (in 
favor of high income/low poverty zip codes) to an extent that cannot be accounted for by 
changes in demographics.  
I then explained this changed relationship between supermarket location and economic 
disadvantage by showing how the institutional logic of the grocery industry – which shifted 
around the mid 1970s – moderates the relationship between economic disadvantage and 
supermarket locations. From the 1930s to the early 1970s the grocery industry had an 
institutional logic of ‘economies of scale’: growth through increasing sales volume. A new ‘mix 
margin merchandising’ logic came about after the mid 1970s: using low margins on high demand 
items (especially ‘staples’) to gain the foot traffic needed to increase sales of high margin items. 
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Further analysis showed that during the transitionary years of the industry (1970 to 1983) 
supermarkets were less likely to locate in economically disadvantaged zip codes when operating 
under a mix margin philosophy. These results indicate that a shift to a ‘mix margin 
merchandising’ institutional logic corresponded with a devaluation of (and exodus from) 
economically disadvantaged areas by the grocery industry after the mid 1970s. 
Second, this dissertation showed how minority competition theory helps explain the 
negative relationship between the percentage of African Americans and the presence of 
supermarkets in a zip code. Using 2010 U.S. national data, the results showed that at low levels 
of African Americans in a city there is low ‘perceived threat’ and low inequality in the placement 
of supermarkets. As the percentage of African Americans in the city increases, supermarkets are 
increasingly located away from African Americans; However, at high levels of African 
Americans in a city, the increasing unequal distribution of supermarkets away from African 
Americans declines - theoretically due to the cumulative effect of discrimination and the 
increased ability to attenuate discrimination when numbers are high. 
In essence, this dissertation suggests that the ‘neighborhood effects’ explanation of the 
presence of organizations in neighborhoods can be better understood as ‘city and/or industry’ (or 
more generally ‘extra-local’) effects. In the same respect, instead of attempting to change the 
demographics of neighborhoods to solve neighborhood resource disparities – the most widely 
used policy tactic (c.f. Hyra, 2013) – policy makers would likely do better to change the city and 
industry causes of these disparities.  
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Policy Implications 
Institutional policies 
Policies that promote or create mixed-income housing neighborhoods may attract 
supermarkets but, unfortunately, these policies can also promote gentrification (Hyra, 2013). 
Conversely, policies addressing the moderating effects of organizational dynamics on 
neighborhoods seem less likely to displace the residents of these neighborhoods. The results of 
this dissertation indicate that policies addressing the institutional logic of the grocery industry 
may help produce more supermarkets in economically disadvantaged areas. In order to address 
the problem of food deserts
41
 policy makers must take into account that the profit made from 
'staples' has been artificially lowered (subsidized) by their use to pull foot traffic needed to sell 
more high-profit specialty items and ‘non-foods’. 
At the federal level, there are very few practical policy solutions to the issue of high 
margin items subsidizing the prices of staples. Before any action at the federal level is to take 
place, debates about the problems of below cost pricing and price discrimination (and market 
regulation more generally) would need to be revisited. In the 1930s through 1960s the 
interpretation of price discrimination law by congress, the FTC and courts focused on protecting 
competitors to preserve long run competitive processes; after the mid 1970s this interpretation 
changed to protecting competition (letting the free market go on unimpeded) not protecting 
                                                          
41
 As stated, the mix margin logic may have beneficial outcomes for low income residents: If 
access is less of a factor for health compared to the price of staples (especially fruits and 
vegetables), the mix margin logic should be favored since it lowers the prices of staples. If access 
is more of a factor for health compared to price then future research, theory and policy should 
deal with the fact that high margin items subsidize the prices of staples (especially fruits and 
vegetables). While a comparative study has not been conducted, a great deal of research has 
shown that the presence or absence of supermarkets effects resident health outcomes. 
104 
 
competitors (Calvani & Breidenbach, 1990; De Toro, 1983). This interpretation of price 
discrimination would need to change. 
The most likely legal avenues to reduce food deserts in economically disadvantaged areas 
are state below cost pricing laws (especially with minimum mark-up clauses). While future 
research is needed to demonstrate this point, these laws may provide a market for smaller 
grocery stores to compete with the sale of staples by supermarkets (who would be limited by law 
in subsidizing these prices with high margin items). Oller (2011) showed that state below cost 
laws (especially laws with minimum mark-up clauses) lead to more small grocery stores. Future 
research would do well to expand upon the relationship between below cost pricing laws and 
grocery store location patterns. Even more, an investigation of the moderating impact of below 
cost laws on the health outcomes of residents of areas without large supermarkets may be 
especially poignant. 
On a similar note, supermarket (location) decision makers may better fit into low income 
areas by understanding how to make a store profitable without relying on the high-margin items 
low income consumers do not purchase. Low margin staples are priced too low to be 
competitively sold without some type of subsidization. Further, raising prices on staples in low 
income areas is unlikely to garner the sales volume needed to sustain their placement in low 
income stores. One possibility is to find high-profit non-foods and specialty foods that low 
income individuals tend to buy, which may offset the costs associated with selling the low-profit 
staples. Further, if certain neighborhoods of low income consumers are willing to buy high-
margin staples – such as specialty meats or organic fruits and vegetables –these low income 
areas would support grocery store types that focus on high-margin food sales over the sale of 
high-margin non-foods. 
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City level minority competition policies 
The policy implications of minority competition are less straight forward. Prior research 
on minority competition theory tends to present the results as implicative in themselves: that is, 
the fact that minority competition effects punishment against the minority group provides 
evidence that punishment should be reduced. This is true here as well – the fact that minority 
competition leads to fewer supermarkets in neighborhoods with more African American provides 
evidence that disparities in supermarkets should be reduced. The specific, real world policy 
implications are much less clear.  
In order to create real world policies, research must first empirically elaborate the actors 
involved in minority competition dynamics. While studies of levels of individual prejudice and 
discrimination are certainly apt, the perceived threat of minorities by the majority may or may 
not reflect the attitudes of individual residents (Blumer 1958). The effect of minority competition 
may work more broadly – inducing a culture of minority threat in the city. For example, a culture 
of minority threat may provoke a heightened sense of privilege for a largely majority area to 
accrue more resources than an area with more minorities (e.g. Blumer 1958), a heightened 
collectively understood stigma of minority dominant areas (e.g. Anderson 1992), a built 
environment that both distinguishes groups and portrays their threat (e.g. Caldeira 2001), or a 
more salient attitude that, since others are prejudice, home or store sales will suffer where 
minorities are more common (and should be avoided). 
Further, when investigating those who discriminatorily react to perceived threats of a 
minority group, urban regime theory (Stone 1989) and urban political economy (Logan and 
Molotch 1987) may provide an avenue for future research and policy ideas. Both urban regime 
and urban political economy theory look past the demand-based or pluralist view of the 
106 
 
distribution of resources in a city. Instead, these theories focus on elite coalitions and ‘growth 
machines’ who attempt to construct and organize the city in ways that serve their particular 
interests. In large part, these theories ignore the independent effects of racial dynamics, viewing 
race as one component to consider in the pursuit of the economic interests of those who govern 
(Kraus 2004). As a group conflict theory in its own right, minority competition theory can be 
studied along with urban regime and urban political economy theories to investigate the unequal 
distribution of resources in cities. One possibility is that minority competition occurs on elites 
through the perceived distinctness of a minority group when their numbers are large (e.g. 
Blumer, 1958). For example, when the percentage of African Americans grows large, efforts 
attempting to foster growth may treat African Americans as a group distinct from – and 
threatening to – the mainstream ‘growth machine’ projects. Further, there may be an interaction 
between elites and a general culture of threat in a city – where elites work to exploit the 
perceived threat of the majority, sometimes for the gain of elites, sometimes for the gain of the 
majority (e.g. see Tomaskovic-Devey and Roscigno 1996). By empirically elaborating minority 
competition dynamics we will be better able to create policies that eliminate their negative 
effects. 
 
Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
Regardless of how exactly minority competition dynamics occur in cities, this 
dissertation argues and empirically demonstrates that minority competition theory can be used to 
explain why zip codes with a higher percentage of African Americans have fewer supermarkets. 
Future research can investigate whether minority competition dynamics can explain why 
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neighborhoods with a higher percentage of African Americans have fewer resources and/or more 
problems (e.g. social/physical disorder, environmental degradation, fear of crime).  
Further, this dissertation argues that, following ‘new institutional’ theory (c.f. 
Greenwood, 2008), institutional environments are the context in which the demographic 
attributes of neighborhoods are perceived, evaluated and acted upon by organizations. 
Institutional logics (c.f. Thornton, Ocasio, Lounsbury, 2012) provide an appealing avenue for 
investigating the ways institutional environments historically moderate the relationship between 
neighborhood demographics and the presence of neighborhood organizations. Using this theory, 
this dissertation showed that the ‘neighborhood effects’ food deserts have on residents do not 
necessarily stem from living in an area with concentrated poverty – they stem from living in an 
area with concentrated poverty during the post-mid 1970s institutional logic of the grocery 
industry.  
The dissertation focuses on the effect of historically contingent institutional logics of the 
grocery industry on the supposedly ‘market-driven’ location behaviors of grocery companies; 
however, future research can examine the institutional environments of a wide variety of 
organizations that moderate a wide variety of neighborhood relationships. For example, future 
research could examine how the rental industry changed over time and between cities to affect 
the resources neighborhoods provide. The rental industry differs from the supermarket industry 
in that it is a more crowded field dominated by local players; nevertheless, major players 
dominate local contexts, and they are likely to be shaped by isomorphic tendencies spanning city 
environments. It is possible the institutional logic of the rental industry changed (e.g. became 
increasingly focused on ‘flexible risk’ over ‘housing development’ to accrue profit), which then 
had effects on neighborhood stability, social capital and/or resident health outcomes. 
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Outside of institutional logics, researchers can investigate the effects of institutional 
environments on neighborhoods in a variety of ways. For example, since organizations attempt 
to gain legitimacy in an institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) this attempt to 
gain legitimacy may affect the ways in which organizations act upon neighborhoods (e.g. 
Marwell, 2007). For example, Steensland (2006) showed that a changed cultural category of 
those in poverty (reclassified as unworthy) in 1960s and 1970s America diffused through 
institutions, affecting welfare policies. It is possible that in order to make an organization 
legitimate, an organization must distinguish between the deserving and undeserving 
neighborhoods in a wide variety of institutional environments. This line of research can extend 
theories of the ways in which institutional environments – by influencing the way organizations 
perceive, evaluate and act upon neighborhoods – affect the lives of neighborhood residents. A 
generalized model of this 'institutional theory of neighborhood effects' is presented graphically in 
Figure 9. 
Finally, as noted, supermarkets were chosen due to their noted influence on communities 
and its residents. While the correlates of supermarkets are discussed in this dissertation, the ways 
cities and industries can moderate the effect of living in an area with limited access to 
supermarkets are not investigated. Using a similar methodology, future research might look at 
possible city or industry dynamics that moderate the impact of living in an area with limited 
access to supermarkets (or any other detrimental neighborhood characteristic). While efforts to 
bring supermarkets to underserved areas are rare (Pothukuchi, 2005), community organizations 
and government efforts to help those with limited access to supermarkets may alleviate the 
stigma or negative health impacts living in an area without supermarkets might have (e.g. see 
Anderson, 2007; Karpyn, Young and Weiss, 2012). Other possible city specific solutions include 
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subsidies for fruits and vegetable sales in underserved areas or well-funded public transportation 
and food stamp programs.  
Further, as discussed, below cost pricing laws with minimum mark-ups may open up 
opportunities for small grocery stores or fruit and vegetable markets to compete with 
supermarkets; along with brining more supermarkets into low income areas, these opportunities 
for alternative stores may moderate the effects of a lack of supermarkets on neighborhoods. This 
dissertation elaborated and demonstrated how industry and city dynamics moderate the effect of 
neighborhood demographics on the presence of supermarkets; these theories can easily be 
applied to the ways in which city and industry dynamics moderate the effect of the presence of 
supermarkets (and other neighborhood resources) on communities and its residents.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
‘By Year’ Summary Statistics 
Variable Years (sample size) 
 
 1970 (n=204) 1980 (n=202) 1990 (n=207) 
 
 Mean 
(sd) 
Min/ 
Max 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min/ 
Max 
Mean 
(sd) 
Min/ 
Max 
 
Super Markets  3.24 
(2.73) 
 
0/15 2.2 
(2.0) 
0/9 1.792 
(1.727) 
0/9 
Population 29149 
(15530) 
 
1002/ 
71691 
26423 
(14130) 
1021/ 
70477 
25769 
(14047) 
1239/ 
71118 
Log(Pop) 10.06 
(0.79) 
 
6.91/ 
11.18 
9.98 
(0.74) 
6.93/ 
11.16 
9.94 (0.78) 7.12/ 
11.17 
%Black 17.22 
(26.21) 
 
0/99 23.01 
(28.06) 
0/100 25.99 
(28.01) 
0/99 
%Poverty 13.69 
(10.60) 
 
2/56 15.73 
(12.23) 
2/65 19.04 
(14.16) 
1/72 
Poverty over 30% 0.103 
(0.305) 
 
 0.154 
(0.361) 
 0.208 
(0.407) 
 
HH Income (2000 
CPI Adjusted) 
51036 
(16918) 
4145/ 
113513 
48367 
(17573) 
13823/ 
119157 
 
44386 
(14880) 
15034/ 
115323 
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Table 2 
‘Differenced Data’ Summary Statistics 
Variables Year 2 – Year 1 (sample size) 
 
 1980-1970 (n=198) 1990-1980 (n=201) 
 
 Mean (sd) Min/ 
Max 
Mean (sd) Min/ 
Max 
 
Super Markets  -1.02 
(1.9) 
 
-7/6 -0.388 (2.11) -8/8 
Population -2700 (5159) 
 
-22739/ 
15392 
 
-259 (4226) -16587/ 
18184 
%Black 5.48 (9.41) -16/40 
 
2.945 (7.15) -15/44 
%Poverty 2.13 (3.7) -9/22 
 
3.03 (2.49) -32/37 
HH Income (2000 
CPI Adjusted) 
-2950 (5556) -15143/ 
31266 
3973 (7338) -35263/ 
20578 
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Table 3 
Models Predicting the Number of Super Markets per Zip Code (per year) 
Variables  Years  
 1970 1980 1990 
Models predicting the relationship between poverty & Super Markets 
Log(Population) 0.87 (0.096)*** 0.79  (0.11)*** 0.86 (0.11) *** 
%Black -0.007 (0.003)* -0.003 (0.003) -0.0028 (0.0029) 
%Poverty 
 
0.018 (0.008)* 0.003 (0.008) -0.023 (0.007) ** 
Models predicting the relationship between Poverty > 30% & Super Markets 
Log(Population) 0.838 (0.096)*** 0.77 (0.11)*** 0.853 (0.109)*** 
%Black -0.004 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.0047 (0.0027)~ 
Poverty >30% 0.247 (0.19) -0.068 (0.19) -0.46 (0.16) ** 
 
Models predicting the relationship between HH Income & Super Markets 
Log(Population) 0.80 (0.091)*** 0.78  (0.11)*** 0.94 (0.11) *** 
%Black -0.002 (0.002) -0.0009 (0.0024) -0.008 (0.003) ** 
HH Income (10k) -0.11 (0.38) 0.047 (0.040) 0.055 (0.044) 
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Table 4 
Changes in, and initial conditions of, the demographics of a zip code predicting changes  
in the number of super markets (over 1 decade) – No categories. 
Variables Years 
 
 1980-1970 1990-1980 
 
Model using poverty 
Differenced Population 
 
1.32 (0.29)*** -0.70 (0.37) ~ 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.034 (0.015)* 0.028 (0.022) 
Differenced %Poverty 
 
-0.013 (0.038) -0.0011 (0.027) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.026 (0.019) -0.013 (0.022) 
Initial %Black 
 
0.009 (0.007) -0.012 (0.008) 
Initial %Poverty 
 
-0.019 (0.019) -0.020 (0.019) 
R^2 0.1773 0.0761 
 
Model using HH Income 
Differenced Population 
 
1.38 (0.28)*** -0.74 (0.37)* 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.035 (0.014)* 0.041 (0.022)~ 
Differenced HH Income  
 
-0.11 (0.24) 0.34 (0.25) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.021 (0.018) -0.019 (0.02) 
Initial %Black 
 
0.006 (0.006) 0.041 (0.022)* 
Initial HH Income 
 
0.10 (0.009) 0.34 (0.25) 
R^2 0.179 0.0801 
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Table 5 
Changes in, and initial conditions of, the demographics of a zip code predicting changes in the 
number of super markets (over 1 decade) – With categories of percent Black 
Variables Years 
 
 1980-1970 1990-1980 
 
Model using poverty 
Differenced Population 
 
1.35 (0.29)*** -0.66 (0.37)~ 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.035 (0.014)* 0.026 (0.022) 
Differenced %Poverty 
 
-0.005 (0.038) -0.0046 (0.027) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.027 (0.019) -0.16 (0.22) 
Initial Low %Black 
(Compared to Mid %Black) 
 
 
-0.13 (0.44) 
 
0.24 (0.44) 
Initial High %Black 
(Compared to Mid %Black) 
 
 
0.93 (0.56)~ 
 
-0.50 (0.61) 
Initial %Poverty 
 
-0.018 (0.018) -0.028 (0.017)~ 
R^2 0.1864 0.0715 
 
Model using HH Income 
Differenced Population 
 
1.41 (0.28)*** -0.70 (0.037) ~ 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.035 (0.014)* 0.041 (0.023)~ 
Differenced HH Income  
 
-0.11 (0.24) 0.34 (0.26) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.023 (0.018) -0.015 (0.20) 
Initial Low %Black 
(Compared to Mid %Black) 
 
 
-0.043 (0.39) 
 
0.53 (0.41) 
Initial High %Black 
(Compared to Mid %Black) 
 
 
0.88 (0.55) 
 
-0.60 (0.60) 
Initial HH Income 
 
-0.10 (0.087) 0.165 (0.111) 
R^2 0.1883 0.0705 
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Table 6 
Changes in, and initial conditions of, the demographics of a zip code predicting changes  
in the number of super markets (over 1 decade) – With economic categories 
Variables Years 
 
 1980-1970 1990-1980 
 
Model using poverty 
Differenced Population 
 
1.24 (0.28)*** -0.50 (0.37) 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.031 (0.014)* 0.028 (0.022) 
Differenced %Poverty 
 
-0.0013 (0.038) 0.009 (0.026) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.28 (0.19) -0.071 (0.021) 
Initial Low %Poverty 
(Compared to Mid %Poverty) 
 
 
0.83 (0.30)** 
 
1.01 (0.37)** 
Initial High %Poverty 
(Compared to Mid %Poverty) 
 
 
-0.35 (0.42) 
 
0.058 (0.46) 
Initial %Black 
 
0.012 (0.007)~ -0.012 (0.007)~ 
R^2 0.211 0.1063 
 
Model using HH Income 
Differenced Population 
 
1.3 (0.28)*** -0.81 (0.36)* 
Differenced %Black 
 
-0.030 (0.014)* 0.022 (0.022) 
Differenced HH Income  
 
-0.12 (0.24) 0.19 (0.24) 
Initial Log(Pop) 
 
-0.25 (0.18) -0.17 (0.21) 
Initial Low HH Income 
(Compared to Mid HH Income) 
 
 
-0.26 (0.42) 
 
-1.07 (0.044)* 
Initial High HH Income 
(Compared to Mid HH Income) 
 
 
0.76 (0.29)** 
 
-0.54 (0.39) 
Initial %Black 
 
0.010 (0.006) -0.015 (0.007)* 
R^2 0.207 0.1066 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
Table 7 
Total Supermarkets per zip code over time 
Zip Code Category 1970 Change 
(1980-1970) 
1980 Change 
(1990-1980) 
 
1990 
Supermarkets per zip code per Log(Population) 
Low %Poverty 0.24 -0.05 0.19 0.05 0.24 
Mid %Poverty 0.36 -0.11 0.25 -0.05 0.20 
High %Poverty 0.29 -0.12 0.17 -0.10 0.07 
Low HH Income 0.32 -0.14 0.18 -0.11 0.07 
Mid HH Income 0.32 -0.10 0.22 0.0 0.22 
High HH Income 0.29 -0.06 0.23 -0.03 0.20 
Total 0.31 -0.10 0.21 -0.04 0.17 
 
Supermarkets per zip code 
Low %Poverty 2.51 -0.53 1.98 0.49 2.47 
Mid %Poverty 3.80 -1.18 2.62 -0.58 2.04 
High %Poverty 2.90 -1.21 1.69 -1.02 0.67 
Low HH Income 3.24 -1.41 1.83 -1.12 0.71 
Mid HH Income 3.38 -1.07 2.31 -0.09 2.22 
High HH Income 3.00 -0.64 2.36 -0.34 2.02 
Total 3.24 -1.04 2.20 -0.41 1.79 
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Table 8 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean (sd) Min / Max 
 
Population 27350 (14939) 521 / 71691 
%Black 21.15 (27.6) 0 / 100 
%Poverty 15.29 (11.7) 1 / 65 
Poverty over 30% 0.141 (0.348)  
HH Income (in 1980 dollars) 24401 (19041) 1984 / 336711 
Stores, Everyday Shopping 1.027 (1.448) 0 / 8 
Stores, One-Stop Shopping 0.9082 (1.208) 0 / 7 
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Table 9 
Predicting the Number of Super Markets per Zip Code: Stores under Everyday  
Shopping vs. One-Stop Shopping Philosophy 
Variables Corporate Philosophy 
 Everyday Shopping One-Stop Shopping 
 
Poverty and supermarkets 
Intercept 
 
-10.849 (0.900) *** -6.381 (0.764) *** 
Log(Pop) 
 
1.067 (0.086) *** 0.642 (0.073) *** 
%Black (10%) 
 
-0.076(0.025) ** -0.050 (0.024) * 
%Poverty (10%) 
 
0.086 (0.064) -0.103 (0.064) 
Poverty > 30% and supermarkets 
Intercept 
 
-10.405 (0.859) *** -6.790 (0.732) *** 
Log(Pop) 
 
1.030 (0.084) *** 0.674 (0.072) *** 
%Black (10%) 
 
-0.051 (0.019) ** -0.077 (0.019) *** 
Poverty >30% 
 
0.012 (0.177) -0.055 (0.176) 
HH Income and supermarkets 
Intercept 
 
-10.046 (0.836) *** -6.935 (0.714) *** 
Log(Pop) 
 
1.026 (0.081) *** 0.676 (0.070) *** 
%Black (10%) 
 
-0.044 (0.016) ** -0.071 (0.016) *** 
HH Income (10k) 0.033 (0.017) ~ 0.043 (0.015) ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
Table 10 
Supermarkets per zip code by category of zip code: Stores under  
Everyday Shopping vs. One-Stop Shopping Philosophy 
Zip Code Category Corporate Philosophy 
 Everyday Shopping One-Stop Shopping 
 
Supermarkets per zip code 
Low %Poverty 
 
1.018 0.895 
Mid %Poverty 
 
1.154 1.154 
High %Poverty 
 
0.828 0.522 
Low HH Income 
 
0.873 0.596 
Mid HH Income 
 
1.071 1.714 
High HH Income 
 
1.090 1.322 
Total 1.027 0.908 
 
Supermarkets per zip code per Log(Population) 
Low %Poverty 
 
0.098 0.087 
Mid %Poverty 
 
0.111 0.112 
High %Poverty 
 
0.080 0.052 
Low HH Income 
 
0.084 0.059 
Mid HH Income 
 
0.103 0.165 
High HH Income 
 
0.107 0.131 
Total 0.099 0.089 
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Table 11 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean / % Min / Max 
 
S.D. 
Level 1: Zip Code (n = 16990)    
Supermarkets 1.23 0/13 1.69 
Population Density, Logged 45.50 0 / 3785 97.92 
Urban Area 0.46  0.50 
%African American 9.68 0/100 17.02 
% in Poverty 13.15 0/100 11.48 
 
Level 2: City (n = 366)    
Population Density, Logged 371.41 17.77 / 4678.61 464.91 
%African American 0.11 0.0 / 0.52 0.11 
%African American
2 
0.02 0.0 / 0.27 0.04 
%African American
3 
0.01 0.0 / 0.14 0.02 
% Unemployed 4.97 2.20 / 9.40 1.12 
% in Poverty 14.64 7.20 / 34.7 3.99 
Northeast 0.13  0.33 
Midwest 0.25  0.44 
South 0.40  0.49 
West 0.22  0.41 
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Table 12 
Fixed Effects of Zip Code Characteristics on the Number of Supermarkets 
Level 1 Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Intercept 1.227 (0.012) *** 
Urban Area 1.316 (0.030) *** 
Population Density, Logged 0.0017 (0.0001) *** 
%African American -0.0025 (0.0009) ** 
% in Poverty -0.0048 (0.0013) *** 
  
Significance code: ~ p < .10, *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 13 
Effects of Zip Code and City Level Variables on the Number of Supermarkets, 
Random Intercept and %African American Slope 
Level 1 
Variable 
Level 2 Variable Coefficient 
Intercept Intercept (Random) -0.1645 (0.0237) *** 
 Population Density, Logged 0.00001 (0.00005) 
 
%African American 3.056 (1.604) ~ 
 %African American 
2 
-6.402 (8.505) 
 %African American 
3 
0.411 (12.613) 
 % Unemployed 0.137 (0.026) *** 
 % in Poverty -0.03 (0.007) *** 
 Northeast (vs. South) -0.325 (0.083) *** 
 
Midwest (vs. South) -0.45 (0.071) *** 
 
West (vs. South) 0.223 (0.094) * 
 
% African 
American 
 
Intercept (Random) 
0.014 (0.002) *** 
 Population Density, Logged -0.000001 (0.000002) 
 %African American -0.4155 (0.106) *** 
 %African American 
2 
1.655 (0.462) *** 
 
%African American 
3 
-1.973 (0.600) *** 
 
% Unemployed -0.00096 (0.00127) 
 % in Poverty 0.0011 (0.0004) ** 
 Northeast (vs. South) 0.0013 (0.0034) 
 Midwest (vs. South) 0.0017 (0.0030) 
 West (vs. South) 0.0011 (0.0054) 
 
Population 
Density, Logged 
 
Intercept (Fixed) 
 
0.0011 (0.00007) *** 
 
% in Poverty Intercept (Fixed) -0.0041 (0.001) *** 
 
Urban Area Intercept (Fixed) 1.116 (0.024) *** 
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Figure 1 
Neighborhood effects model 
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Figure 2 
City moderation of neighborhood effects 
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Figure 3 
Organizational moderation of neighborhood effects 
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Figure 4 
‘Neighborhood effect’ model based policies 
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Figure 5 
Organizational moderation based policies 
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Figure 6 
Institutional environment moderation of neighborhood effects 
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Figure 7 
Institutional logic / Historical moderation model of neighborhood effects 
 
      Time 1            Time 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Logic 
Neighborhood 
demographics 
(e.g. Racial 
composition, % 
in poverty)  
Neighborhood 
characteristics 
(e.g. # of 
supermarkets) 
Institutional 
Logic 
Neighborhood 
demographics 
(e.g. Racial 
composition, % 
in poverty)  
Neighborhood 
characteristics 
(e.g. # of 
supermarkets) 
130 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
General institutional theory of neighborhood effects 
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Appendix 
Company Historical 
Change 
 
Source 
A&P 1968 A&P 1968 & 1973 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Acme 1978 See esp. American Stores 1977 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Albertsons 1969 Progressive Grocer. 1984. "Another banner year." AND 
Supermarket News. 1984 "Albertson's using DPP for 15 years."  
Alpha Beta 1978 See esp. American Stores 1977 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Big Star 1980 Grand Union 1978, 1980-1983 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Jewel Early 1960s Jewel 1970 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Kohls 1983 Progressive Grocer. 1984. "The Kohl's turnaround: all in a day's work." 
Kroger 1972 Kroger 1971 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Lucky 1982 Lucky 1983 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Marsh 1977 See esp. Progressive Grocer, 1992. “Marsh knows supermarketing: for 
six decades, Marsh Supermarkets Inc. has been on the leading edge of 
the food business. And that's where it plans to stay."  
Milgram 1978 Progressive Grocer. June 1984. The long haul back. 
Minyard 1984 See esp. Progressive grocer. Nov. 1984. “Minyard picks up the pace.” 
Also see P.G. May 1985: Minyard's Texas-size ambition”. 
Pick n' Save Did not Change 
by 1984 
Supermarket News. 1984. "Independents urged: fight super depots with 
old strengths." AND Progressive Grocer. 1985. "Pick 'n Save making it 
famous in Milwaukee”  
Purity 1984 Supermarket News. 1985. "SGC to double capital spending." AND 
Supermarket General Corp. 1984 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Quality Food 
Centers 
(QFC) 
1981 Supermarket News. 1987. "QFC making its initial public stock 
offering." 
Red Owl 1986 See esp. Supermarket News 1986. "Restored Red Owl aims high." AND 
Supermarket News. 1989. “Red Owl sells some outlying retail stores.” 
Safeway 1977 Safeway 1976 S.E.C. Public Filing 
Sentry Did not Change 
by 1984 
Supermarket News. 1988. "Sentry Markets tells shoppers its stores are 
'just your size.'" AND Supermarket News. 1984. "Independents urged: 
fight super depots with old strengths." 
Seessel 1984 Progressive Grocer. 1988. "Non-foods pro brings new profits to 
Memphis independent." AND Supermarket News. 1986. "Seessel's uses 
winged inserts to enhance its nonfood image." 
Stop & Shop 1982 Progressive Grocer. 1984. "The emphasis is on superstores." AND 
Supermarket News. 1985. "Stop & Shop ponders stores outside 3-state 
area." 
Super Valu Did not Change 
by 1984 
Supermarket News. 1984. "Super Valu taking Pantry Pride depot." 
Tom Thumb 1973 Progressive Grocer. March 1984. Tom Thumb: portrait of a master 
combo store operator 
Tops Market 1983 See esp. Supermarket News. 1986. "Tops slates $4.5 million expansion 
of NFS Depot." 
Winn-Dixie 1984 Winn-Dixie 1984 S.E.C. Public Filing 
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